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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of sensing capability on ground 
platform survivability during ground force maneuver operations. Sensor classification 
probability of ground platforms and speed of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are the 
factors being studied, and the Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) agent-based 
simulation software was used to create a hypothetical Ground Force Maneuver Operation 
Scenario for this exploration. 
A tailored Waterfall systems engineering process model guided the study in 
identifying alternatives which, other than increasing armor thickness, can improve 
platform survivability during ground force maneuver operations. The Nearly Orthogonal 
Latin Hypercube was the Design of Experiment methodology used to determine the 
number of design points to be simulated, and the results generated from the multiple 
simulation runs were analyzed using regression analysis and partition tree analysis.  
The sensor classification probability of the Bradley M6 Linebacker and M1A2 
Abrams Main Battle Tank, and the speed of UAV, were identified to be the three most 
significant factors affecting platform survivability. More importantly, the study provides 
decision makers with quantitative data, which can be used as references to determine the 
requirements for sensing capability enhancement programs.  
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Advancement in weaponry technology and rapid changes in the operation environment 
have made ground maneuver forces, comprised of armored platforms, more susceptible to 
attacks. Therefore, there is impetus for the U.S. Army to examine ways to improve the 
survivability of the land platforms on which soldiers operate and travel. The Mine-
Resistance Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is a good example illustrating the efforts 
made to protect the troops within. The protection concept of improving platforms’ 
passive armor has been proven successful. However, as the focus is on improving 
protection, lethality and mobility aspects of the platforms are being traded off. Up-
armoring platforms is a passive approach, and often the up-armor kits are designed to 
defend against specific threats and have to be consistently improved to keep abreast with 
the advancement of weaponry. In additional, existing platforms have almost reached their 
payload limits, rendering the increase of armor thickness to be a nonviable approach. 
Such issues provide strong motivation to identify alternative solutions to improve land 
platforms’ survivability.   
The author proposes a proactive approach, which studies the effects of improving 
platform sensing capabilities to increase the survivability of platforms when maneuvering 
in a hostile environment. Improved sensing capability enables land platforms to identify 
adversaries faster and gain the advantage to strike first to annihilate the threat sources. In 
this thesis, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are modeled to act as additional sensors for 
ground maneuver forces. Effects of sensor classification probability at maximum range of 
the various land platforms and the speed of UAVs are examined to determine their 
effectiveness in improving ground maneuver forces’ survivability during operations. 
A hypothetical ground force maneuver scenario is modeled using the Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) software. The land platforms studied are: the M1A2 
Abrams main battle tank (MBT), the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and the 
Stryker infantry carrier vehicle (ICV). The adversaries, modeled to be in an ambush 
operation, have similar fighting capabilities, and have fire support from attack helicopters 
 xvii 
and 120 mm mortars. The performance parameters for the platforms modeled (agents) are 
based on open source information and references from theses as exact figures are not 
available due to classification. Nevertheless, the MANA model is still useful, and the 
results can be used as a reference to facilitate decision making.   
The measures of effectiveness (MOE) identified to address stakeholders’ 
requirement and concerns are Percentage of Blue Casualties and Probability of Mission 
Success. Both MOEs are able to reflect the survivability of ground platforms during 
ground force maneuver operations. The analysis found three factors that have significant 
effects on platform survivability, namely (in order of significance): IFV sensor 
classification probability, MBT sensor classification probability, and UAV speed. While 
the results may seem obvious to many, the important findings are the quantitative values 
of sensor classification probabilities and UAV speeds that can provide decision makers 
with reference figures to determine the target figures to be achieved. From this study, air 
defense capability, presence of MBT within ground maneuver forces, and the presence of 
UAVs are key capabilities that improve ground maneuver forces’ survivability.  
The systems engineering (SE) approach is used to identify plausible alternatives 
to improve ground maneuver forces’ survivability, and a tailored Waterfall SE process 
model guided the study. Modeling and simulation are used to analyze one of the 
alternative solutions identified, effects of sensing capability, on land platforms’ 
survivability. Thirty-three different test configurations were created using the nearly 
orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) method for design of experiments, and the results 
obtained from the simulation runs were analyzed using regression analysis and partition 
tree analysis.  
The study on effectiveness of the UAV in this thesis is not exhaustive. The 
maneuver distance model is only about 20 km. For longer distances, UAVs launched 
from base would not be able to provide full coverage due to the operating range of 
UAVs. Hence, one interesting area to be explored would be developing an effective 
method to launch and retrieve UAVs by ground maneuver forces “on the fly,” which may 
be of interest to the U.S. Army. 
 xviii 
The other possible area of research is to incorporate terrain elevation features into 
the MANA scenario to study the effects of sensor classification probability, sensor 
detection range, and other sensor attributes. With elevation features added, line of sight of 
sensors would be affected, and the study could lead to other discoveries. 
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Ground maneuver forces, comprising armored platforms, tracked and wheeled, 
are becoming more susceptible to attack when they maneuver across hostile 
environments. Their operating environment changes rapidly as adversaries constantly 
learn and adjust the way they operate, making it extremely difficult for ground forces to 
predict, prevent, and stay abreast of the emerging threats. In addition, adversaries have 
advanced over the years, and may soon reach war fighting capabilities comparable to 
those of the United States. Therefore, the U.S. Army must examine ways to improve the 
survivability of ground platforms and protect the lives of soldiers in them. Survivability 
of platforms is defined as the ability of a platform to avoid or withstand a hit. 
A. CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO IMPROVE PLATFORM 
SURVIVABILITY 
The conventional approach revolves around improving platforms’ passive 
protection to reduce their vulnerability when hit. The ArmorSite details the evolution of 
the protection system upgrades of the M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT). From the first 
version of the MBT to the current version M1A2, protection of the MBT has always been 
improved to defend the vehicle against evolving threats. In the earlier versions, the 
approach taken had been adding passive armor to the platform. The Abrams uses 
composite armor, which is composed of a combination of materials with different types 
of hardness, elasticity, and heat and shock absorption properties. Little is known on the 
composition of materials of the composite armor due to classification. The newer 
versions of the MBT have an additional depleted uranium plate to increase its protection 
level (Prado 2012). However, the mobility of platforms is reduced when they are 
mounted with heavy passive armor modules, and the additional weight accelerates the 
wear and tear of components.  
The same trend of adding passive armor can be seen in the Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicle (IFV) and the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle (ICV). Due to the payload 
limits of these platforms, passive armor would not be able to provide the same level of 
protection as it does on the MBT. For example, Stryker can only accommodate slat armor 
 1 
(cage armor), which is much lighter in weight, to defend itself as it cannot take the weight 
of heavy passive armor modules.   
While up-armoring a platform may sound like a simple solution, implementation 
is not. Extensive and costly modifications, such as replacement of the suspension, 
transmission, and brake and vehicular control systems, need to be performed. In addition, 
existing platforms deployed in theater may have reached their maximum payload, making 
it no longer technically feasible to continue to increase armor thickness. 
Active protective systems (APS) and explosive reactive armor (ERA) have also 
been developed to overcome weight limitations and to further improve platform 
survivability. As reported in Defense Industry Daily, the Tank Urban Survival Kit, 
comprised of ERA, for the M1A2 has been developed to enhance the MBT’s protection 
(Defense Industry Daily 2008). There is no open source information on the development 
of APS for the Abrams. It was reported on the Armored Vehicle website that the Bradley 
IFV has also been equipped with ERA to enhance its protection (Jones 2014). However, 
there are concerns about collateral damage to friendly forces in the open when APS and 
ERA are being activated. Both systems will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
The conventional approach is largely passive as it focuses on preventing the 
platform from being penetrated when hit. It might also take years for the industry to 
develop the next generation of lightweight and cost-effective passive armor and minimize 
the degree of collateral damage for APS and ERA systems.  
B. THESIS APPROACH 
The author adopted a systems engineering (SE) approach to identify plausible 
approaches, other than the conventional method, to improve the ground platform’s 
survivability when maneuvering in a hostile environment. The focus of this thesis is to 
analyze the effects of sensor quality (which essentially is the probability and range of 
classifying targets) on platform survivability when maneuvering in hostile environment. 
With adversaries also using state-of-the-art weapons, the ability to see first and shoot first 
is critical. As opposed to the conventional passive approach to reduce vulnerability, the 
ability to destroy adversaries first before being engaged is an active approach which 
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could improve ground platform survivability. This capability provides platform 
commanders additional reaction time to make decisions for the next course of action, 
which is either to evade or defeat the threat before their positions are exposed. Such 
threats provide strong motivation to examine this area in more detail.   
A hypothetical ground force maneuver scenario is modeled using Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) software to examine the effects of factors identified on 
platform survivability. The classes of ground platforms studied in this thesis are the 
M1A2 Abrams MBT, the Bradley IFV, and the Stryker ICV. The adversaries are 
designed to have similar ground fighting capabilities. In addition, the effects of 
employing unmanned air vehicles (UAV) are studied. With the organic ability to scan and 
perform reconnaissance, the survivability of ground platforms may increase. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following are the initial five research questions that guided this thesis. 
Having gone through the systems engineering process and researches done on the thesis, 
the author narrowed the list of five questions to the first three. Effects of APS, ERA, and 
mobility are not modeled and studied in the MANA model developed; therefore, 
questions four and five are not being addressed in this thesis. 
1. What are the primary design factors for ground platforms in order to 
achieve mission success and survivability in ground force maneuver 
operations? 
2. What are the key sensor attributes that have effects on platform 
survivability? 
3. What are the available mature technologies that have the potential to 
protect ground platforms against threats that can penetrate through their 
armor? 
4. How would APS improve the survivability of ground platforms?  
5. What is the relationship of sensor capability, as well as mobility, to the 
need for passive armor?  
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D. CONCURRENT STUDIES  
The thesis, which focuses on ground platforms’ survivability in ground force 
maneuver operations, is made in conjunction with two other theses that explore offensive 
and defensive operations, respectively, in an urban environment. The effects of protection 
systems such as passive armor, APS and, ERA are being studied in the thesis on 
offensive operations, and the effects of sensor classification range, mobility and 
protection systems are being studied in the thesis on defensive operations.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
Ground force maneuver force operations are prone to a wide spectrum of threats, 
such as 120 mm rounds fired from adversaries’ MBTs, anti-tank guided missiles 
(ATGM), air-to-ground missiles (AGM), and AGM rockets fired from attack helicopters, 
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers fired by small pockets of adversary troopers, 
120 mm mortar bombs or 155 mm artillery shells, anti-tank mines, and many more.  
This chapter describes the threats, the ground platforms studied, and the modeling 
software used in this thesis. The descriptions are briefly presented to provide readers with 
some basic knowledge on the items being discussed, and for the ease of reader 
understanding.  
A. THREAT ANALYSIS  
This section describes the potential threats ground platforms faced during 
maneuver operations in hostile environments. The variety of threats presented is not 
exhaustive, and only the more common ones are being addressed in the simulation model.   
1. 120 mm Tank Munition 
The two most common types of 120 mm tank munition are (1) the armor-piercing, 
fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSD), kinetic energy (KE) rounds (which is a high 
kinetic energy penetrator rod), and (2) the high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds with 
shaped-charge warheads that have the capability to penetrate through the armor 
protection of the ground platforms. It has been claimed by the munition manufacturer that 
both types of 120 mm munitions are capable of penetrating through the thick armor of 
MBTs (Alliant Techsystems 2011). Both 120 mm munitions have an effective range of 
approximately 4,000 m (Treml 2013).  
2. Kinetic Energy Penetrator Attack Mechanism 
The kinetic energy (KE) penetrator uses kinetic energy to penetrate the thick 
armor of ground platforms. As explained in the article, “Spall Liner: From Fiber to 
Protection,” the killing mechanism for the KE penetrator is the heat, high pressure, and 
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spalling effects as a result of energy transfer during impact and penetration of the armor. 
Spalls, which are small pieces of material breaking away from a large piece of material, 
are formed as a result of tension and compression forces that act on the material when a 
penetrator rod forces its way through the passive armor. The spalls formed with high 
energy can kill the soldiers and destroy the equipment behind the armor. Figure 1 
provides an illustration of spalling when an armored platform is hit by a kinetic 
penetrator (Bircan, Eksi, and Erbil 2011). The kinetic energy required to achieve such an 
effect is generated from the propellants in the munition which delivers the munition with 
an extremely high muzzle velocity that accounts for the high kinetic energy.  
 
Figure 1.  Spall cone and armor penetration without spall liner (from Bircan et 
al. 2011). 
3. High Explosive Anti-Tank Attack Mechanism 
The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad field manual explains that the attack 
mechanism of the high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) munition is the penetration through 
armor protection with a high energy copper jet formed upon impact of the shaped-charge 
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warhead. During impact, the high explosives in the warheads detonate and create a high 
energy copper jet that can penetrate through the thick armor of ground platforms. Similar 
to the KE penetrator, spalling occurs as well. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the 
shaped-charge kill mechanism (Department of the Army 2007). 
 
Figure 2.  Shaped-Charge Mechanism (from Department of the Army 2007). 
4. Anti-Tank Guide Missiles  
One example of an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is the tube-launched, 
optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) weapon system that has the ability to destroy main 
battle tanks and other types of armored and soft skin platforms. As stated on the 
manufacturer’s website, the TOW can be a standalone weapon system and can also be 
integrated onto platforms. Examples of such platforms are the Bradley IFV and the 
Stryker ICV. The TOW can either be fitted with a HE or HEAT shaped-charge warhead, 
and the attack mechanism is similar to that of a 120 mm HEAT munition (Raytheon 
Company 2014). The extended range version, TOW-2B Aero, has an engagement range 
up to 4,500 m (Chand 2014). 
5. Attack Helicopters 
Attack helicopters are effective against ground platforms as their weapon 
engagement range is often beyond the engagement range that ground platforms can easily 
reach. An attack helicopter also flies at high speed, and Boeing, the manufacturer of the 
AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, claims that the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter can fly 
at a maximum cruise speed of about 284kph. Ground attack helicopters can be equipped 
with air-to-ground (AGM) missiles and rockets which makes them lethal to ground 
platforms, which usually have poor roof protection. For example, the AH-64’s weapon 
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payload comprises laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, Hydra-70mm rockets, and 
M230 30mm automatic cannon (Boeing 2014).  
Hellfire missiles have shaped-charge HEAT warheads and are capable of 
destroying an MBT. These missiles have an operational range between 500 m to 8,000 m 
(AeroWeb 2014). The Hydra-70mm rocket is also capable of engaging from air to ground 
and has a maximum range of 10,500 m. It can be fitted with a high explosive warhead 
that is effective against soft skin platforms, but it lacks precision (Army Technology 
2014). Similar to the Hydra-70mm rocket, the M230 30mm cannon is effective against 
soft skin platforms and troops at a range of up to 4,000 m (Alliant Techsystems Inc. 
2011).  
6. Rocket Propelled Grenade 
The rocket propelled grenade (RPG-7) is a man portable, shoulder-launch, anti-
tank weapon. It has a shaped-charge warhead that is capable of penetrating the thick 
armor of MBTs and other armored vehicles that are less protected than the MBTs. The 
RPG-7 has an effective range of 500 m (Atronic 2014). 
7. Anti-Tank Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices 
Anti-tank mines are conventional weapons used against tanks, and there are many 
types for specific classes of platforms. They have the ability to incapacitate, if not 
destroy, platforms. Improvised explosive devices IEDs are often used in the same 
manner, and the only difference between a mine and an IED is the flexibility and ease of 
manufacturing of IEDs. IEDs can be in different shapes and sizes, making them 
extremely difficult to detect and classify. Anti-tank mines are mostly passively triggered 
by pressure on the mine when tanks go over them. IEDs, on the other hand, can be 
remotely detonated within a short range. 
8. 120 mm Mortar Bombs 
The 120 mm mortar bomb is fired indirectly on targets. The M120 120 mm 
mortar has a maximum effective range of 7,200 m (Federation of American Scientists 
2000). These bombs fired have high explosive warheads and could probably destroy or 
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incapacitate ground platforms on impact. The base plate positions are typically located 
miles away, beyond the line of sight of the ground platforms. This makes it extremely 
difficult for ground maneuver forces to deliver counter battery fire on the mortar 
positions when ground maneuver forces are not equipped with counter battery fire 
detection radars. 
9. Threat Analysis Summary 
For lethality, the focus has generally been on improving weapons engagement 
range and armor penetration capability. Advances in technology have enabled the 
development of new weapons capable of engaging targets with higher precision and 
greater penetration capability. In areas of platform protection, the focus currently is on 
developing a lightweight protection system with the ability to prevent weapon penetration 
through the platforms’ armor. Unfortunately, development of protection systems requires 
time and money, and new protection systems must pass through stringent qualification 
tests before they can be introduced into service. Often protection system developments 
are reactive and result from new emergent threats that the current protection systems 
cannot counter. Thus, using the current development model, it is not long after enhanced 
protection systems are introduced into service that they become obsolete.  
B. PLATFORM DESCRIPTIONS 
This section presents the specifications of the platforms that are being studied and 
modeled in this thesis. The specifications of the platforms presented are not exhaustive as 
capabilities of platforms could be sensitive. The information presented is obtained from 
open sources available on the Internet. 
1. M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank   
The M1A2 Abrams is the United States’ leading MBT, recognized as one of the 
most powerful platforms of its class. As stated on the website of the original equipment 
manufacturer, General Dynamics Land Systems, the MBT weighs approximately 70 tons 
and can travel at a maximum speed of 68 km/hr. Its main armament is the 120 mm 
smoothbore gun, and its secondary armaments include the 0.5-inch Browning M2 
machine gun, a 7.62mm M240 coaxial machine gun, and a loader’s 7.62mm M240 
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machine gun. The Abrams has the capability to defeat platforms of its class and those 
below it (General Dynamics Land Systems 2014). It is revealed on the Armor Site 
website that the MBT’s 120 mm main gun is capable of engaging targets up to 4,000 m 
away, and the known protection of the M1A2 includes passive armor and ERA against 
incoming projectiles, and belly armor against mine blasts (Prado 2012). 
2. Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle   
The Bradley is the United States’ IFV. It has the capability of providing 
protection to the troops being transported in it in a hostile environment, and of engaging 
adversaries as well. According to the manufacturer’s website, the Bradley IFV weighs 
approximately 34 tons and can travel at a maximum of 61 km/hr. The baseline variant 
Bradley IFV has a 25mm Bushmaster cannon, which fires both explosive and armor 
piercing rounds, and a 7.62mm M240 coaxial machine gun. The M6 Linebacker and the 
Calvary fighting vehicle are the two variants of the Bradley IFV discussed in this thesis. 
Both variants can be fitted with add-on passive armor to provide the platforms with 
additional protection (BAE Systems 2014).  
The Bradley M6 Linebacker is equipped with four Stinger missiles, which gives it 
the capability to provide air defense. The FIM-92 Stinger is a surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) that has maximum engagement range of up to 8,000 m (Federation of American 
Scientists 2000).  
The Bradley Cavalry fighting vehicle, another variant of the Bradley IFV, is 
equipped with two BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile launchers, which give it the 
capability to defeat main battle tanks and other classes of platforms, and carries up to ten 
(Conner 2014) TOW missiles. The BGM-71 has a shaped-charge warhead, and one of the 
variants, the TOW-2B Aero, has the highest engagement range of 4,500 m among the 
variants (Chand 2014).    
3. Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle  
The Stryker is the United States’ ICV, and is a wheeled, armored personnel 
carrier which has the capability to provide protection to the troops in it. Based on the 
manufacturer’s product specifications, the Stryker weighs about 16 tons, and has a 
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maximum speed of 96 km/hr (General Dynamics Land Systems 2014). It was reported on 
Defense Update that The Stryker can be mounted with slat armor to provide protection 
against RPGs to increase its survivability (Defense Update 2006). Slat armor is also 
known as bar armor or cage armor. Of the few variants of the Stryker, the one being 
analyzed in this study is the Stryker-ATGM variant. The main armament for the Stryker-
ATGM is a two-tube launcher for TOW missiles, which has an engagement range of 
approximately 4,500 m (Chand 2014). 
4. Raven Unmanned Aircraft System  
According to the manufacturer’s product information, the Raven unmanned 
aircraft system (UAS) is a lightweight portable UAS, and weighs about 2 kg. The light 
weight allows it to be hand launched. It has an operating range of 10 km, an operating 
height ranging from 30 to 152 m above ground level, and it flies at a speed range from 31 
to 81 km/hr. The Raven is battery operated, and has an endurance of 60 to 90 minutes 
when rechargeable batteries are used. Its endurance increases to 80 to 110 minutes when 
single-use batteries are used. The sensor used for aerial surveillance could either be a 
thermal imager or electro optics, depending on the variant. It can be controlled using a 
lightweight handheld console (AeroVironment 2014).  
5. M198 155 mm Howitzer 
The M198 Howitzer is a medium-size field artillery system used by the United 
States to provide indirect fire support for the U.S. Army. The M198 fires standard 155 
mm projectiles and has a maximum effective range of 30,000 m (Federation of American 
Scientists 2000).  
6. Platform Description Summary 
Each platform has its own capabilities, which is evident from the weapon systems 
that are integrated onboard. The Bradley IFV and Stryker ICV are good examples to 
illustrate this point. Both platforms are designed with multiple variants, each for a 
specific mission objective. For example, the M6 Linebacker is equipped with Stinger 
missiles for air defense, and the Bradley Cavalry fighting vehicle is equipped with TOW 
missiles to take out adversaries’ armored vehicles. Information regarding protection 
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systems of these platforms is mostly classified; therefore, open source information about 
them is limited. However, the general protection design requirements are guided by the 
types of potential threats that the platform might be exposed to in theater and the payload 
limitation, which limits the weight of the systems that can be integrated onto the 
platforms. 
C. PLATFORM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Ground platforms provide ground maneuver forces with the defense capability to 
achieve mission success and provide protection to the soldiers that operate or travel in 
them. Platform design revolves around three main design traits, namely: Protection, 
Mobility, and Lethality. The relationships between these three traits are often represented 
by the “Iron Triangle” of platform design, and designers need to find a balance or optimal 
design point that adequately addresses them. Due to the specific requirements for each 
trait, a designer may not be able to enhance all three areas together. Generally, two of the 
three traits can be improved at the expense of degrading one. But the two being improved 
would not be at the optimal design point of each of the two traits. See Figure 3 for an 
illustration of the process of finding the optimal design point in the Iron Triangle of 
ground platform design. 
 
Figure 3.  Iron triangle of ground platform design. 
The trait to be improved or focused on may be determined by the ground 
platforms’ mission. Once decision makers decide on the traits to focus on, the platform’s 
design will focus on the decided traits. The performances of these three traits are often 
dependent on the capability of the base platform because the payload threshold usually 
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imposes design constraints. Payload here refers to the weapon and protection systems that 
can be integrated onto the platform and has a direct effect on the platform’s mobility.  
Each of the three traits of platform design has a direct impact on the survivability 
of a ground platform. A platform with high mobility provides the platform the ability to 
evade incoming projectiles, the ability to maneuver in terrain where the adversaries least 
expect, and the ability to quickly maneuver out of the danger zone, making it more 
difficult to be tracked by adversaries. Therefore, the platform should be highly mobile. 
Lethality provides the platform with the ability to take down targets, which eliminates the 
threat source that can inflict damage or destroy the platform. Hence, the lethality of a 
platform can also serve as a form of deterrence to adversaries. From this perspective, 
lethality also indirectly improves platform survivability. Lastly, protection is directly 
linked to platform survivability. A more protected platform will have higher 
survivability. The latter two often reduce platform mobility due to the increase in weight 
when more systems are integrated onto the platform. 
This focus of this thesis is to identify factors other than increased armor 
protection to improve platform survivability, and the MANA software is used to model 
the operational scenario which facilitates the study on the parameters that would affect 
platform survivability. 
D. AGENT-BASED MODELING SOFTWARE – MAP AWARE NON-
UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA)  
The MANA software is an agent-based, time step, stochastic, mission-level 
simulation model developed by the New Zealand Defence Technology Agency. The 
MANA user manual provides users with the understanding of how effective MANA is, 
and how to use it. MANA can be used to model and study military operation scenarios. 
The agents created in MANA are map aware, which means they are capable of 
interacting with the terrain and surroundings created in the operational scenario with their 
sensors, and react according to their behavior attributes settings. The agents are non-
uniform, which means they can be modeled individually. Automata, which means agents 
behave based on their behavior attribute settings, are independent of the scenarios. 
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Behavioral attributes refer to the way agents move, sense, shoot, and communicate 
according to the situation of the individual agents (Anderson et al. 2007). 
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
Systems engineering is a field that analyzes, solves, and manages complex 
problems. The process follows structured steps, adopts a holistic approach to address 
customer’s needs, and analyzes the required functionality, systems requirements and 
systems supportability throughout the entire lifecycle in the early stage of the project.  
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL 
The author modified Winston W. Royce’s Waterfall SE process model, developed 
in 1970, and tailored it to guide the study of this thesis (Blanchard and Fabrycky). The 
tailored Waterfall model is presented in the Figure 4. The model is iterative, and each 
phase of the model can provide feedback to any of its preceding phases. The model starts 
with Threat Analysis to collect information, understand the threats, and analyze the 
capabilities of the ground platforms studied in this thesis. That sets the stage for the 
Problem Definition phase, which identifies the current capability gaps and the desired 
future situation. Stakeholders Analysis is also done at this stage to identify their primitive 
needs. The process then moves on to operational analysis, functional analysis, and 
analysis of alternatives. The selected alternatives will be modeled using MANA 
simulation software, and the data generated will be analyzed to find out the response to 
the changes made to the variable. Details of each stage of the systems engineering 
process are presented and discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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Figure 4.  Tailored Systems Engineering Waterfall Process Model. 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Advancements in technology have created weapons that are far more lethal than 
they used to be. The conventional approach of increasing passive armor thickness on 
ground platforms may not be the way ahead as advancements in weaponry are going at a 
faster pace than armor protection development. Adding to the difficulty of protecting 
against increasingly lethal weapons, most existing platforms are reaching their weight 
limits, making it technically not feasible to keep adding passive armor thickness. This 
weight limit, the platform’s maximum allowable total weight, is determined by its 
superstructure, suspension, transmission, and braking and other supported systems. 
Therefore, there is a need to identify other approaches to improve ground platforms’ 
survivability while developments in armor protection are still in progress. Systems 
engineering, which is a structured approach to analyze systems and solve problems, is the 





















The solutions could be near term or long term, and a wider variety of survivability 
enhancement options may evolve.   
C. CURRENT CAPABILITY GAPS  
Currently, ground platforms are unable to adequately protect themselves and the 
soldiers operating in them against large caliber munitions such as the 120 mm KE and 
HEAT munitions. This section discusses the technology challenges faced and the inherent 
limitations of ground platforms in improving these platforms’ survivability. Weight 
limitations and existing platform design are the inherent limitations of ground platforms 
identified. Technology challenges include the effectiveness and concerns to integrate 
ERA and APS into existing platforms. Lastly, battlefield situation awareness level of 
ground platforms is identified as one of the capability gaps that need to be bridged to 
improve ground platform survivability.    
1. Weight Limitation 
Existing ground combat platforms are almost reaching their maximum weight 
limits, and increasing passive armor thickness to defend against incoming projectiles will 
soon be a non-viable solution. Equipping platforms with all-round protection is becoming 
too heavy for even main battle tanks to support. The 120 mm kinetic energy munition still 
remains as a great threat to passive armor. Protection systems such as ERA and APS have 
been developed, and we have seen some main battle tanks being installed with ERA; 
however, little is known about platforms that are installed with APS.  
2. Protection Systems – Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) 
ERA is a type of armor that is comprised of explosives sandwiched between two 
metal plates. As presented in a study done on disturbance of ERA by jet penetration, 
when an incoming projectile hits the ERA, the explosives are detonated and two metal 
plates are pushed out by the explosives, which break the flight path and reduce the energy 
of the incoming projectile causing it to lose its penetrating capability (Li, Lv, and Yan 
2014).  
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ERA is effective against HEAT munitions, and some companies claim that their 
ERA is capable of defeating KE penetrators, which has yet to be proven. However, like 
slat armor, ERA is quickly defeated by projectiles with tandem warheads. Tandem 
warhead projectiles have two shaped-charges within the same warhead. The first shaped-
charge detonates the ERA, and the second shaped-charge simply penetrates the bare 
armor beneath the ERA with ease and destroys the platform, including the personnel 
within. Although ERA can be stacked together to protect against tandem shaped-charge 
warheads, the weight limit of the platform often does not allow the doubling of ERAs. 
Development of ERA is ongoing, and it will probably take a while until they are fully 
developed. There are also concerns on collateral damage. 
3. Protection Systems – Active Protective Systems (APS) 
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems claims that their APS when integrated with 
ground platforms has the ability to detect incoming projectiles and fire a counter 
munition to successfully defeat or break the path of the incoming projectile. Furthermore, 
this APS is able to provide the platform with 360-degree protection against single or 
multiple incoming projectiles. (Rafael Advanced Defense Systems 2014).  
It is not publicly known which countries have installed such systems on their 
platforms. However, there are two common concerns related to APS. One is their ability 
to stop KE penetrators due to their high incoming speed, and the other is collateral 
damage to own troops, especially when there are troops in open or in soft-skin platforms. 
Little technical information on the APS can be found in open sources. With APS 
installed, there might still be a need to equip platforms with passive armor or ERA as a 
secondary protection layer to defend against leakers (incoming threats that are not 
defeated by APS or ERA). Again, keeping within the weight limits may pose challenges 
to platform designers. Unlike ERA, which requires mainly mechanical modification, APS 
integration requires both electrical and mechanical modifications. 
4. Ground Platform Roof Protection  
Protection for ground platforms has always been focused on side, frontal, rear, 
and belly protection. Comparatively, there is little focus on roof protection. One possible 
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reason for this could be the low probability of air attack in the past when the platforms 
were developed. Hence, traditionally roof protection has not been the area of focus. To 
improve roof protection for existing ground platforms, the structural strength of the 
platform must be studied to determine whether the structure can take the weight of the 
heavy passive or ERA protection modules. The addition of protection modules to the roof 
of platforms might lead to other integration issues such as increased dead ground (areas 
blocked from crew observation) for platform commander and driver, or obstructed turret 
slew. When dead ground increases, the area which the driver and commander can see 
from their position decreases, making it more difficulty for the driver to drive, and for the 
commander to guide the driver.  
5. Battlefield Situation Awareness 
Battlefield situation awareness of ground platforms is limited by their line of 
sight, making them very vulnerable to long range attacks such as: artillery firing and 
missiles fired from attack helicopters. Engagement ranges of such adversaries’ 
weaponries provide the advantage to engage ground forces from locations that are beyond 
their lines of sight. Although the platforms have combat management systems that will 
map out the locations of threats discovered by other sensors, these platforms are not able 
to engage the target before being engaged due to no line of sight. Although ground 
platforms can rely on supporting units from other services to provide situational 
awareness, support units may not be readily available. The mission might still need to 
proceed even without external support, making the ground platforms more susceptible 
and vulnerable.  
D. DESIRABLE SITUATION 
It is desirable for ground platforms to be equipped with 360-degree protection 
against advanced weaponry to improve their survivability. While the development of 
protection systems is still ongoing, there is a need to explore and develop stopgap 
measures. Additionally, employing UAVs as sensors, coupled with indirect cover fire 
support, would greatly enhance ground platforms survivability during maneuver 
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operations. Having the UAVs as organic assets would reduce the reliance on other 
services.   
E. CONSTRAINTS IDENTIFIED 
The constraints identified are: (1) existing platforms reaching their weight limits, 
(2) development of new protective armors such as lightweight passive armor, and (3) 
sensing limitation of ground platforms. 
F. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS  
Stakeholder analysis identifies the parties that have interests in the problem, and 
allows the systems engineer to find out and analyze their needs. This section lists the 
stakeholders and their descriptions in terms of their power of influence and their level of 
interest in ensuring that ground platforms are highly survivable during operations, which 
eventually leads to mission success.  
1. Identifying Stakeholders 
Five stakeholders have been identified and ranked in order of priority, and the 
prioritization methodology is based on their power of influence and level of interest. The 
stakeholders are: (1) U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), (2) U.S. ARMY, (3) Program 
Executive Office Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS), (4) U.S. Congress, and (5) 
Defense Industries. 
2. Stakeholder Description and Analysis 
The U.S. DOD’s mission is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and 
to protect the security of the United States (DOD 2014). The DOD is the main 
stakeholder, and being the decision maker, DOD has the highest power of influence and 
level of interest to ensure that ground platforms are adequately protected against 
incoming threats fired from adversaries, which is closely aligned to their mission 
statement. Their concern would be how to acquire new and effective protection 
capabilities in the shortest possible time to bridge the U.S. Army’s capability gap.  
The U.S. Army, being the direct user of ground platforms, is aware of the lethality 
of the types of threats and understands areas that need to be improved to enhance 
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platform survivability. The U.S. Army Equipment Modernization Strategy captures the 
organization’s key operational priorities of which “remaining prepared for decisive action 
by increasing lethality and mobility, while optimizing the survivability of our vehicle 
fleets is one of the areas of focus” (Mchugh and Odierno 2014). Therefore, they have 
significant influence over the types of protection systems to be integrated onto the ground 
platforms. The U.S. Army also has a high level of interest as a better protected platform 
minimizes casualties and increases mission successes. Their troops currently in theater 
are facing a wide spectrum of threats, and the U.S. Army would like to equip them with 
effective protection capabilities to protect these troops as soon as possible. Their current 
stop gap measure is to constantly review their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 
to stay abreast of the rapid changing operational environment.    
The Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS) is the 
acquisition branch of the U.S. Army, and is responsible for providing world-class 
affordable, relevant, and sustainable ground combat equipment to Joint Warfighters. The 
systems under PEO GCS’ purview include the Abrams main battle tank, Bradley family 
of vehicles, towed and self-propelled howitzers, Stryker family of vehicles, robotics and 
unmanned ground systems (PEO GCS 2014). Being at the technological forefront of the 
U.S. Army, they possess a high power of influence over the protection systems that are 
suitable for ground platforms as they are the ones who will test and evaluate the 
suitability of various types of protection systems proposed by suppliers. They also have a 
high level of interest in ground platform survivability as one of their roles is to 
incorporate lethality, survivability, mobility, and adaptability improvements of ground 
combat vehicles for the warfighter. 
The U.S. Congress is the next main stakeholder in the topic of interest of this 
thesis. As the sponsor for all military programs, the Congress has a high power of 
influence over military expenditures. Being the legislative branch of the federal 
government, they are responsible and accountable for the money spent on defense 
(CongressLink 2014). Therefore, one of their roles is to ensure prudent spending. 
The defense industries are the developers of the protection systems. They 
influence the designs of the type of protection systems that can be integrated onto ground 
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platforms. Their level of interest would be high since this is a profitable business area and 
would help them boost their reputation in the marketplace if their systems are being used 
on U.S. ground platforms. 
To summarize, stakeholders need their ground platforms to be adequately 
protected against advanced weaponry faced in theater to protect troops operating on or 
transiting within the platforms during operations to increase mission success probability. 
Any proposed solution need(s) to be cost effective, and if it is a long-term solution it 
would take a while before implementation. Therefore, stopgap measures should be 
available. Having analyzed and identified the needs of stakeholders, the next phase in the 
systems engineering process model, Operational Analysis, will be presented. 
G. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Ground maneuver forces are required to perform a wide range of operations 
which for ease of understanding can be classified into Offensive, Defensive, and 
Maneuver Operations, and the focus of this thesis is on Ground Force Maneuvers. 
In the Joint Capability Area (JCA) 2010 refinement paper, JCA 3, Force 
Application, is defined as the ability to integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in 
all environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission objectives. Maneuver, 
as defined in JCA 3.1, is the ability to move to a position of advantage in all 
environments in order to generate or enable the generation of effects in all domains and 
the information environment. Maneuver is further subcategorized into four categories 
namely, Maneuver to Engage, Maneuver to Insert, Maneuver to Influence, and Maneuver 
to Secure (J7 Joint Force Development and Integration Division 2011).   
A hypothetical scenario for a ground forces maneuver operation has been created 
for the purpose of this study and is described here. 
1. Generic Ground Force Maneuver Operations Scenario 
The operational scenario, shown in Figure 5, is to maneuver Blue forces 
comprising a company of Abrams MBT, a company of Bradley IFV, and a company of 
Stryker ICV from base camp to a designated location. It is anticipated that there are 
adversaries (Red forces) in ambush along the movement route. The maneuver operation 
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force is broken down into three teams at intervals of ten minutes, and the formation of 
each team is in the following order: MBT followed by IFV and lastly ICV, each with a 
platoon size.  
The type of MBT and ICV are the same for all three teams, and for the IFVs, with 
the first team of IFV comprising M6-Line Backers and the remaining two comprising 
Bradley ATGM variants. The rationale is to provide the first team, also known as 
Advance Platoon, with air defense capabilities. Fifteen minutes prior to moving out, two 
units of Raven UAVs will be deployed for aerial surveillance. When Red forces are 
spotted by the UAVs, artillery fire will be activated to neutralize the threats. An M198 
155 mm Howitzer platoon will be providing cover fire for the maneuver operation. Red 
forces are modeled to comprise 120 mm mortars, attack helicopters, anti-tank mines, 
troops with RPG-7, soft-skin trucks with anti-tank guided missiles and MBTs.     
 
Figure 5.  Generic Ground Force Maneuver Operations (from Google maps 
2014). 
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2. Operational Activities for Ground Force Maneuver Operations 
The operational view (OV)-5b model of the DODAF Framework Version 2.02 is 
used to describe the operational activities (OA) that are conducted within the ground 
force maneuver operations. OA are the work that must be done, and by mapping out the 
OA, the required functions can be identified (DOD 2010). 
OV-5b, presented in Figure 6, illustrates the Level-1 OA needed to perform 
ground force maneuver operations. The maneuver mission starts with OA1.1, launching 
UAVs to execute area surveillance. During this OA, outputs such as images will be 
transmitted back to headquarters for processing. The next OA, OA.1.2 to OA.1.4, would 
be ground platform teams transiting to the destination at ten-minute intervals. During 
maneuvers, the platforms will be communicating battlefield situation updates with 
headquarters. Concurrently, OA.1.5, 155 mm artillery will be providing cover fire for the 
maneuvering forces throughout the entire mission. They will be triggered to fire once 
upon receiving firing instructions. Each Level-1 OA will be further illustrated down to 
Level-2 OAs in subsequent sections.    
 
Figure 6.  OV-5b Operational Activity. 
a. OA.1.1 Execute Aerial Surveillance 
Figure 7 illustrates OA.1.1. The UAV will be launched 15 minutes prior to the 
ground platforms to sense threats. When launched, the UAVs can either follow pre-
determined waypoints to capture images of the environment to be sent back to 
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headquarters for processing and to the combat management systems onboard the ground 
platforms or follow new flight instructions. Flight instructions could be to hover around 
targets when detected or take a different flight path.  
 
Figure 7.  OA.1.1 Execute Aerial Surveillance. 
b. OA.1.2 Transit to Destination 
Figure 8 illustrates OA.1.2. Fifteen minutes after the deployment of UAVs, the 
ground platforms will commence ground force’s maneuver operations. During transit, the 
platforms will constantly be scanning for threats, and communicate with headquarters for 
updates of the battlefield situation. When adversaries are sighted, the ground force will 
employ weapons to engage them. In the absence of threats, ground platforms will 
continue to maneuver to their destination. The sequence of activities for OA.1.3 and 
OA.1.4 are the same as OA.1.2.  
 
Figure 8.  OA.1.2 Transit to Destination. 
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c. OA.1.5 Provide Cover Fire 
Figure 9 illustrates OA.1.5. When the UAVs are deployed, the 155 mm artillery 
unit is on standby waiting for targeting instructions. Once instructions to engage the 
target are received, the weapons (155 mm artillery) are positioned and employed to 
engage the target. Upon successful destruction of targets, a situation report will be 
updated to headquarters.  
 
Figure 9.  OA.1.5 Provide Cover Fire. 
H. GROUND MANEUVER FORCES CONTEXT DIAGRAM 
The context diagram presented in Figure 10 depicts the ground platforms’ 
interaction with external elements in their operating environment. Analyzing the context 
diagram allows the identification of types of interactions and the resources being 
transferred between the ground maneuver forces and the external elements.  
 
Figure 10.  Context Diagram (Blue Maneuvering Forces). 
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1. Elements Description 
The elements will be explained starting from the left and moving downwards, 
followed by moving from the right and downwards. 
(1) External Support (Artillery) 
The M198 155 mm howitzer provides covering fire for the ground maneuvering 
forces. The link between them is an indirect fire support link. 
(2) Unmanned Air Vehicles 
The UAVs are the additional sensors to the ground maneuvering forces. This link 
is the communication link where the images captured by the UAVs are being transmitted 
to the combat management system in headquarters and to the platforms. 
(3) Global Positioning System Satellite 
This is the link on which the onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver 
obtains the position coordinates of the ground platforms to determine their own location. 
(4) Headquarters 
This is the information exchange link for maneuvering forces to communicate 
with headquarters (HQ) on the latest updates on the battlefield. 
(5) Red Forces 
This is the combat link between the Blue and Red forces. The link is physical as 
there are munitions exchanged during engagements. The link is also a non-contact link 
when information such as location data, physical appearance, signature, and 
characteristics of each party are being exchanged.   
(6) Road Conditions 
This is the road condition when the ground platforms are transiting to the 
destination. The road conditions link is physical, providing road feedback through contact 
between ground platforms and the road, affecting the traveling speed.  
(7) Environment 
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This is the weather link during operations. The environmental link provides 
environmental information, such as temperature, wind direction, rain, and humidity 
readings to the ground platforms. 
With the operational scenarios and context diagram analyzed, the next step would 
be to perform function analysis to identify the functions of the ground platforms for 
ground force maneuvering operations. 
I. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A function is an action performed to achieve a desired outcome, and in the 
defense context, usually the function is mission objectives. Functional analysis looks into 
what a system is supposed to do, and not how the system will be doing it. Often engineers 
tend to approach the problem from a solution-based mentality which narrows the 
exploration of other viable approaches to solve a problem. Focusing on functions widens 
the solution space and promotes exploration and analysis of multiple alternatives. 
1. Functional Decomposition 
The analysis method for functional analysis is functional decomposition. 
Functional decomposition first identifies the high-level critical functions that are required 
to be performed by the system to achieve the objectives. Each high-level function is then 
further decomposed into its sub-level functions, which are more specific. This approach 
simplifies a complex problem by breaking up the problem into smaller manageable 
portions, which are easier to resolve. 
Figure 11 illustrates the functional decomposition of the high-level function 
labeled Maneuver Ground Forces. During maneuver operations, the OAs are: Maneuver 
Platform, Scan for threats, Communicate with HQ, Employ Weapons, Provide Protection, 
and Receiving Battle Field Status updates. From these activities, the six critical functions 
identified are: Move Assets, Sense Adversaries, Protect Crew, Attack Adversaries, 
Communicate Information, and Monitor Area of Operations. Details of the critical 
functions and sub-level functions will be discussed further in this section. For this thesis, 
the functions are decomposed to the second level only. A description of the functions is 
provided in Table 1. 
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Figure 11.  Functional Decomposition. 
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Table 1.   Functions Descriptions. 
Functions Descriptions 
0. Maneuver Ground 
Forces 
Maneuver ground platforms across hostile or unknown terrains. 
1. Move Assets Move assets physically from base to destination. Assets refer to 
the platforms, troops, equipment, and logistics supplies. 
1.1. Navigate Route Provide driving route directions for platforms to move from 
base to destination. The next level of sub-functions may 
include Determine Own Location, Plan Route, and Display 
Route, etc. 
1.2. Drive Platforms  Control platforms. The next level of sub-functions may include 
Go Forward, Go Backward, Steer Direction, Stop Platform, etc. 
1.3. Transport 
Resources 
Move resources from base to destination. Resources include 
troops and logistic supplies. The next level of sub-functions 
may include Provide Seats, Store Items, Secure Items, etc. 
2. Sense Adversaries Keep a look out or search for adversaries while maneuvering 
within area of operations. 
2.1. Detect Objects Spot objects at a distance away. 
2.2. Classify Objects Determine the type of objects detected. 
2.3. Identify 
adversaries 
Differentiate objects classified between friend or foe. 
3. Protect Crew Prevent crew from injury or death. 
3.1 Avoid Adversaries’ 
Detection 
Prevent the ground platforms from being detected and targeted. 
The next level of functions may include Reduce Platform 
Signature, Camouflage Platforms, etc. 
3.2 Defeat Incoming 
Munitions 
Prevent munitions from hitting the platforms. Munition refers 
to projectiles, penetrator rods, warheads, etc. The next level of 
functions may include Detect Incoming Munition, Classify 
Incoming Munition, Compute Countermeasure, Employ 
Countermeasure, Display Warning Signals, etc. 
3.3 Prevent Armor 
Breakthrough 
Prevent munition from penetrating through the armor, killing 
troops within, and destroying the platform when being hit. The 
next level of functions many include Stop Penetration, Deflect 
Munition, etc. 
4. Attack Adversaries  Destroy adversary platforms, troops, or equipment. 
4.1 Employ Weaponry
  
Use onboard weapons to destroy adversaries. The next level of 
functions may include Fire Weapon, Reload Weapon, Conduct 
Battle Damage Assessment, etc. 
4.2 Track Adversaries Maintain sight on adversaries identified. The next level of 
functions may include Follow Adversaries Movement, 
Compute Adversaries Speed, Determine Distance, Compute 
Firing Settings (direction and elevation angle), etc. 
5. Communicate 
Information 





Send information across wireless network. Information refers 
to data, images, or voice messages. The next level of functions 
may include Establish Communication Link, Encrypt 
Information, Send Information, etc. 
5.2 Receive 
Information 
Obtain information from radio frequency network. Information 
refers to data, images, or voice messages. The next level of 
functions may include Establish Communication Link, De-
Encrypt Information, Project Information (voice messages or 
images), etc. 
6. Monitor Area of 
Operations 
Provide battlefield situation awareness. 
6.1 Display Map Provide visual image of map of operation environment with 
location of own forces and adversaries spotted. 
6.2 Update Map Process information received and update location of own forces 
and adversaries when there are any changes.        
 
After identifying the functions of the systems, the requirements definition can be 
analyzed and determined. In addition, the outputs of functional analysis facilitate the 
generation or exploration of design alternatives.  
The purpose of this thesis is to study the effects of alternatives to improve 
platform survivability. Therefore, requirements analysis will not be done in this thesis. 
The next chapter studies the alternatives that are available to improve the survivability of 
ground platforms. 
J. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
There are two approaches to improve the survivability of the ground platforms. 
The author generally classifies the alternatives into two types, namely: the passive 
approach and active approach. 
The passive approach employs countermeasures when the platforms are being 
fired upon. Protection systems such as passive armor, explosive reactive armor, and 
active protection systems are examples of the passive approach to protect the ground 
platform. The similarity in them is that the adversaries have already fired at the ground 
platforms, and the munitions are on their flight path toward the ground forces. So it is the 
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effectiveness of these protection systems in responding to the incoming munitions that 
will affect the platform’s survivability. 
Another passive approach would be to improve the mobility of the ground 
platforms. A high mobility platform has a higher chance of evading incoming munitions 
when being fired at. High mobility also makes it harder to be engaged.  
The active approach employs countermeasures to engage adversaries first before 
ground forces are engaged. The following are some alternatives that can be considered. 
1. Signature Management 
Avoiding being seen can be achieved by integrating stealth technologies such as 
camouflaging the platforms using some specialized paint to alter the infrared signature of 
the platform. This measure allows the platforms to blend in with their surroundings, 
making it difficult for them to be seen on thermal imagers. Modifications to reroute 
exhausts is another way to change the heat signature of the platform, and this increases 
the difficulty of being detected and classified by thermal imagers. 
2. Sensing Capability 
Another active approach alternative is to improve the lethality of the platform. 
When ground maneuver forces meet adversaries with almost equivalent lethality, the 
determining factor would depend on who can see and shoot faster. Without changing the 
weaponry of the platforms, increasing the speed of the ground platform’s sensing 
capability could increase the success in engaging an adversary first. Speed of sensing can 
be a function of the detection range, object classification probability, and identification 
probability. The further the detection range, the earlier an object can be detected. A 
higher probability of object classification and identification reduces the time required to 
determine the type of object that has been detected and whether the object is friend or 
foe. Employing UAVs as sensors for ground platforms enhances the sensing capability of 
ground maneuver forces, giving them better situation awareness and more planning time 
to respond to changes in the operational environment.   
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3. Battlefield Management System 
Having updated information on what is happening in the operational environment 
allows commanders on the ground to better plan the next course of action and improve 
mission success and reduce attrition. This is achievable with a robust, secure, and fast 
communication network.   
4. Potential Scope of Analysis on Survivability Improvement 
Figure 12 presents the potential areas that can be explored and analyzed for their 
effects on platform survivability. 
 
Figure 12.  Potential Scope of Analysis on Survivability Improvement. 
The author’s intent is to explore alternatives to improve platform survivability. 
The alternatives should not cause a significant increase in the weight of the platform, as 
existing ones are already reaching their weight limits. Furthermore, the alternatives 
should not require significant modifications, and should be able to be modeled in MANA 
simulation software for high fidelity. Battle tactics related alternatives are not studied, as 
the focus of this thesis is on technologically feasible solutions. 
Effects of Explosive Reactive Armor, Active Protection System, and Passive 
Armor Thickness may potentially result in exceeding the weight limits of existing 
platforms. Weapon Systems, Platform Mobility, and Signature Management may require 
significant modifications.  
 33 
Thus, between communications and sensor capabilities, the author chooses to 
explore the area of sensor capabilities as the effects of communication have been 
previously studied in another Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, “Determining 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance System Effectiveness and Integration as 
Part of Force Protection and System Survivability” (Soh 2013). Within the scope of the 
study defined, the next chapter presents the Alternatives Analysis Methodology used.   
 34 
IV. ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Use of the systems engineering approach helped identify various alternatives that 
could potentially resolve the problems identified in the previous chapter. However, not all 
alternatives are effective and need to be analyzed. Methods such as modeling and 
simulation, evaluation of the technical specifications, rapid prototyping, analyzing past 
data, and comparing these methods against other similar systems can be used to analyze 
the effectiveness of the alternatives. Each of the methods has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Therefore, the suitability of the analysis approach must be considered. 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS  
Prior to determining which analysis approach to adopt, the measures of 
effectiveness (MOE), which measures the effectiveness of the alternatives needs to be 
identified. An MOE addresses stakeholders’ requirements and concerns, and measures 
the degree to which the alternative is able to meet the mission objectives. Two key 
stakeholder concerns are: survivability of ground platforms and mission success. The 
MOEs identified to address these concerns are: Percentage of Blue Casualties and 
Probability of Mission Success. Percentage of Blue Casualties reflects the survivability of 
ground platforms, and a lower percentage implies higher survivability. The force 
exchange ratio (FER) was also considered as an MOE; however, it was dropped 
eventually as FER focuses on attrition warfare, in which the key objective of such 
warfare is to attrit opponent’s strength to a targeted percentage.  
B. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Modeling and simulation (M&S) is used in this study, as it facilitates the analysis 
of systems’ behavior without the need to conduct physical tests. M&S is widely used to 
model combat scenarios and requires relatively shorter time and lower cost to study the 
feasibility of alternatives. It allows engineers to understand how systems respond in a 
virtual environment and identifies areas that need to be improved before physical tests or 
physical constructions are carried out. M&S also minimizes the effort and cost required 
to retrofit the physical platform. 
 35 
C. SIMULATION SOFTWARE SELECTION 
The process of determining which software to use starts with analyzing the 
requirements to obtain the MOEs. To study the effects of sensor properties on ground 
platform survivability in maneuver operations, a ground force maneuver operations 
scenario needs to be modeled and simulated. The effects of terrain have to be modeled as 
terrain affects ground platforms’ mobility. Ground platforms, air platforms, and 
personnel need to be represented in the model as agents with mobility, lethality, sensor 
capability, and protection characteristics, as well as communication capabilities.  
Mobility refers to the agents’ movement speed on different types of terrain and 
during different battlefield situations. Lethality refers to the weapon engagement range, 
probability of hit and penetration capability, etc. Sensor capability refers to the sensor 
characteristics, such as detection range, classification range, identification range, etc. 
Protection refers to level of munition penetration that can be stopped, and the effects on a 
platform’s cover and concealment. Lastly, communication refers to the ability of agents 
created in the model to exchange information with one another. 
The agents created in the model need to have behavioral characteristics to respond 
to battlefield scenarios, such as engaging, and being engaged by opponents. Most 
importantly, the software has to generate meaningful data, including force attrition, 
mission success, time to complete mission, and so forth for analysis. 
The software requirements listed can be met using agent-based simulation 
software. At NPS, Pythagoras Agent-Based Modeling and MANA Agent-Based 
Modeling software are commonly used. Both are suitable, and MANA was chosen 
because it offers an online tutorial and research associates with experience in MANA 
were available at NPS to help the author learn this new software. Sensor attributes such 
as detection range, average time between detection, sensor classification range and 
probability, and sensor arc (field of view) can be varied. These features facilitate the 
study of effects of sensor attributes on a ground platform’s survivability during maneuver 
operations. The next section illustrates the MANA scenario that was created.     
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D. MANA SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
The scenario is first discussed in Chapter III. The mission is to move Blue ground 
maneuvering forces, comprising one company of Abrams, Bradleys, and Strykers each 
from base (right of scenario map) during daytime to a destination (left of scenario map) 
over a distance of about 20 km. The MANA scenario created is presented in Figure 13. 
The terrain features modeled in this scenario are light bush, dense bush, water bodies, 
road, dirt track, and buildings.  
 
Figure 13.  MANA Scenario. 
These features each have their own effects on going, cover, and concealment 
settings, which are tabulated in Table 2. “Going” is a MANA terrain attribute that refers 
to terrain maneuverability. In MANA, the effects of the three features are represented 
with a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 means no effect and 1 means full effect. Using “going” as 
an example, 0 going means the terrain cannot be passed through and 1 means the terrain 
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can be passed through at an agent’s maximum speed. Each terrain type is represented by 
a specific Red Green Blue color code (RGB) setting. Therefore, scenarios can be created 
in other graphics software and loaded into MANA, and with the corresponding RGB 
settings entered in the terrain editor, MANA will recognize the terrain and assign it with 
the correct terrain feature.  
Table 2.   Terrain Properties. 
  Terrain Properties RGB Setting   
Terrain Going  Cover Conceal Red Green Blue Color 




bush 0.2 0.3 0.9 40 180 40 Dark Green 
Water 0 0 0 0 38 255 Blue 
Road 1 0 0 255 255 0 Yellow 
Dirt Track 0.85 0 0 255 209 127 Brown 
Buildings 0 0.5 0.7 96 96 96 Grey 
 
Terrain Elevation is not modeled in the MANA scenario, as the hypothetical 
terrain is generally flat with some vegetation. The author recognizes the reduction in 
fidelity when terrain elevation is not modeled. The issue arises when ground platforms, 
given their engagement range, will be able to engage mortar and artillery deployment 
sites that are typically beyond their line of sight, which is unrealistic. The workaround for 
not including terrain elevation in the MANA scenario is to not allow Abrams, Bradleys, 
and Strkyers to engage mortars and artillery. Mortars and artilleries can to engage one 
another when triggered by Red force forward observer and Blue force UAV respectively.  
Agent Evasive Actions are not modeled in the MANA scenario as they are TTP 
that can improve or even reduce the platform’s survivability. Not modeling evasive 
actions might reduce the fidelity of the model. However, TTP are not modeled, as they 
might influence the results, making it difficult to determine the significance of sensing 
capabilities on platform survivability. The results obtained from this thesis could be read 
as the baseline scenario when battle tactics are not incorporated. Instead of incorporating 
evasive actions for agents to exit the kill zone, the speed of Blue force platforms is 
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reduced by 50 percent to simulate the Blue forces slowing down to locate and destroy the 
adversaries when being engaged. 
Troops seldom fight until total annihilation in reality and would usually retreat or 
call for reinforcement when attrition reaches a threshold. However, in the model used 
here, the troops are designed to fight until total annihilation. This may seem unrealistic. 
However, allowing the forces to fight until total annihilation facilitate the study on the 
effects of the factors to be varied for the simulations.      
1. Agent Description and Trigger States 
The force structures of Blue and Red forces modeled in the MANA scenario are 
tabulated in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Force Structure for Blue and Red Forces. 
 
 
The agents’ weapon performance and sensing capabilities used in the model 
follow the settings used in MAJ Tobias Treml’s NPS thesis, “An Revolutionary 
Approach for the Development of Future Ground Combat System Specifications.” The 
weapon systems, sensor systems, and trigger states of Blue and Red agents are provided 
in Table 4. Trigger states define how agents behave in different situations. Blue force 
weapon and sensor systems are modeled according to the descriptions in Chapter II. Red 
force agents are modeled to have capabilities equivalent to those of the Blue forces.  
Blue forces are modeled to transit at a constant speed of 56 km/hr or 30 miles/hr 
(U.S. Army Transportation School 2014). Upon engagement by Red force, Blue forces’ 
speed slows down to half of its traveling speed. The Red forces are modeled to be in 100 
percent concealment (ambush  in vegetation) during the start of the simulation, and are 
Blue Force Size No. of Agents Red Force No. of Agents
M1A2 Abrams MBT 1 Company 12 MBT 4
Bradley-M6 Linebacker IFV 1 Platoon 4 Technical ATGM 4
Bradley-ATGM IFV 2 Platoons 8 Infantry - RPG 4
Strkyer- ATGM IFV 1 Company 12 M120 120mm Mortar 4
Raven UAV -- 2 Forward Observer 1
M198 Howitzer 1 Platoon 6 Attack Helicopter 3
Anti-Tank Mines 3
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therefore non-detectable by the UAVs. Their concealment drops to 50 percent when they 
start firing at the Blue forces, exposing their locations to Blue force sensors. 
Table 4.   Agent Description. 




- 120 mm Main 
Gun 
- 0.5 CAL Machine 
Gun (MG) 
- 7.62mm Coaxial 
MG 









- Movement with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact State 1 
- 50% of movement speed with 
weapons and sensors enabled 
when contacted. 
Run Start 
- 0% movement speed for 15 




- 25mm Bushmaster 
- Stinger  Surface to 
Air Missile  
- 7.62mm MG 
TI and EO 
Default State 
- Movement with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact State 1 
- 50% movement speed with 
weapons and sensors enabled 
when contacted. 
Run Start 
- 0% movement speed from start 
until 1 minute after Abrams 
deployed (movement 





- 25mm Bushmaster 
- BGM-71 TOW 
ATGM  
- 7.62mm MG 
TI and EO 
Default State 
- Movement with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact State 1 
- 50% movement speed with 
weapons and sensors enabled 
when contacted. 
Run Start 
- 0% movement speed from start 
until 1 minute after Abrams 
deployed (movement 








- BGM-71 TOW 
ATGM 
- 0.5 CAL MG 
TI and EO 
Default State 
- Movement with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact State 1 
- 50% movement speed with 
weapons and sensors enabled 
when contacted. 
Run Start 
- 0% movement speed from start 
until 1 minute after Bradleys 
deployed (movement 





NONE TI and EO 
Default State 
- Flight Path follows way points 
with sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact 





155 mm artillery 
munition NONE 
Default State 
- Weapons enabled and waiting 





Same as M1A2 Abrams 
Default State 
- 0% movement in 100% 
concealment with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact 
- 0% movement in 50% 
concealment with weapons and 





- BGM-71 TOW 
ATGM 
- 7.62mm MG 
TI and EO 
Default State 
- 0% movement in 100% 
concealment with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
Enemy Contact 
- Movement towards target in 
50% concealment with 
weapons and sensors enabled 
when contacted. 
INF-RPG 
(RED) RPG 7 TI and EO 
Default State 
- 0% movement in 98% 
concealment with weapons and 
sensors enabled.  
 41 




- Hellfire Missiles 
- Hydra 70mm 
Rockets 
- 30mm Cannon 
TI and EO 
Default State 
- Flight Path follows way points 
with weapons and sensors 
enabled.  
Run Start 
- Launch helicopters 21 minutes 
to simulate activation of 




120 mm Mortar 
munitions NONE 
Default State 
- Weapons enabled and waiting 




NONE TI and EO 
Default State 
- 0% movement in 98% 





Explosive Pressure Sensor 
Default State 
- 0% movement in 98% 
concealment with sensors 
enabled. 
Taken Shot(Pri) 
- Agent changes color to 
indicate activation of mine. 
 
Table 5 presents the Killer Victim Matrix of the agents modeled in MANA. This 
matrix illustrates the engagement capability of the agents against one another modeled in 
MANA. Killer represents a shooter agent, and Victim represents the target being shot at. 
A ‘K’ denotes the ability of a shooter to kill or destroy a target, and an ‘NK’ denotes the 
inability of a shooter to kill or destroy a target. Fratricide does not occur in the MANA 
model, as agents are modeled to aim and shoot only at opponents.  
  
 42 
Table 5.   Killer Victim Matrix. 
 
 
2. Model Assumptions  
Listed are the assumptions for this model: 
(1) Fratricide 
There is no fratricide, as forces are modeled to shoot only at opponents. Even 
though it might happen in real situations, the probability of occurrence is probably low as 
a result of enforcing TTP, such as aim before firing. Including fratricide increases the 
difficulty in determining the significance of the factors that have effects on platform 
survivability.   
(2) Communication 
Communication between Blue forces is 100 percent reliable. This removes the 
variability in the results due to communication reliability. Moreover, the focus of this 
analysis is not on communications. Keeping this communication constant allows better 




























M1 Abrams K K K NK K K NK
Bradley M6 LineBacker NK K K NK K K NK
Bradley-ATGM K K K NK NK K NK
Stryker-ATGM K K K NK NK K NK
M198 Howitzer K K NK K NK NK NK
UAV NK NK NK NK NK NK NK
MBT K K K K NK K
Technical-ATGM K K K K NK K
INF-RPG K K K K NK NK
120mm Mortar K K K K NK NK
Attack Helicopter K K K K NK K
Forward Observer NK NK NK NK NK NK













(3) M198 155 mm Howitzer 
The Red force is not modeled to be equipped with counter-battery radar systems 
and UAVs to detect locations where artillery projectiles are fired from. Therefore, the 
Red force does not have the capability to engage the Blue force M198 Howitzer. 
(4) M120 120 mm Mortar 
Blue force ground platforms are modeled with the inability to engage the Red 
force 120 mm mortar platoon even though the platoon is within the Blue force ground 
platform’s detection range. This is to simulate that Blue force ground platforms do not 
have Line Of Sight to the mortar baseplate position, which is usually true in a real 
situation. Counter-battery radar systems are not modeled as the additional sensors for 
Blue force ground platforms as the Blue force UAVs can perform the function of 
detecting Red force 120 mm mortar platoon.  
(5) Environmental Conditions 
Effects of weather, such as wind, temperature, and rainfall, cannot be modeled 
directly in MANA. Changing hit and detection probabilities of agents can be done in 
MANA to mimic environmental effects. For example, reduction in visibility on rainy 
days can be modeled by reducing the probability of detection, and effects on trajectory 
paths of weapons due to wind conditions can be modeled by reducing the probability of 
hit. However, environment effects may not be uniform within the area of operations, and 
modeling the effects might give either force an advantage over the other. This increases 
the difficulty of determining the significance of the factors that have effects on platform 
survivability. Therefore, the results and analysis are based on a “perfect weather” 
situation.  
(6) Anti-Tank Mines 
Blue force ground platforms modeled do not have the capability to detect and 
destroy anti-tank mines. In addition, platforms with mine plows are also not modeled. 
However, mines are still included to increase the realism of the scenario. Occurrences of 
platforms destroyed by mines are based on probability. 
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(7) Forward Observer 
The Red force forward observer’s (FO) main task is to spot an incoming Blue 
force contingent, and activate mortar fire on them. The FO does not carry any weaponry 
to engage Blue forces. 
E. BASELINE MODEL VERIFICATION 
The baseline model is comprised of agents that were described in the operational 
scenario as illustrated in Chapter III. Prior to performing extensive simulation runs with 
different variable values, there is a need to verify the model created. Two verification 
tests are conducted to determine whether the agents are behaving in accordance with their 
behavioral attributes, and they are described in Appendix A. Both tests verify that the 
model works as designed. The MANA model file and the Excel spreadsheet containing 
details of agents’ settings are being kept with the NPS Seed Center.1  
F. STOPPING CONDITIONS FOR SIMULATION 
The stopping conditions for a single simulation run are the following: 
1. Blue force loses all its Ground Platform agents, or  
2. When the last Blue force squad reaches the destination, or  
3. When the maximum time of 10,000 time steps is reached.  
G. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
This objective of analyzing alternatives is to find out their effectiveness in 
improving ground platforms’ survivability during maneuver operations. The scope of this 
thesis studies the effects of sensing capability on ground platform survivability. Through 
the MANA model created, sensor attributes can be varied to find out their effects on 
platform survivability. There are many data analysis methods available, and regression 
analysis and partition tree analysis are assessed to be the most suitable analysis methods 
to be used for this study. 
1  Please contact Professor Tom Lucas, Director, Seed Center, twlucas@nps.edu. 
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1. Regression Analysis 
From Chapter XII of Probability and Statistic for Engineers and Scientist, 
regression analysis is explained as a statistical approach for analyzing relationships 
between the dependent variable, Y, and one or more independent variables, X. The 
purpose of this approach is to identify a regression function that can describe the 
relationship between the variables and to predict the value of the dependent variable 
when the values of the independent variable changes (Hayter 2012). In this study, the 
MOEs for platform survivability is the dependent variable, and the sensor attributes are 
the dependent variables X.  
The main effects, two-way interaction and second order polynomial of the 
variables will be studied to identify the significant variables that affect the platform. The 
R2 and adjusted R2 values obtained from the regression model can be related to the 
accuracy of predictions made using the regression function derived and depends on how 
well the regression model fits into the data. R2, also known as the coefficient of 
determination (Hayter 2012), is the percentage of variability in responses that can be 
explained by the regression model, and a high R2, ideally = 1, is desired. 
Residual analysis as explained in Chapter XII of Probability and Statistic for 
Engineers and Scientist is used to check whether the fitted model is appropriate, the error 
variance is constant, the error terms are normally distributed, and to identify data points 
that are outliers (data points that do not follow the general trend of the rest of the data). 
The analysis is done by examining the residual plot (residual by independent variable 
plot). Figure 14 depicts the types of residual plots. A random plot means that the data is 
normally distributed with constant variance, a mean of zero, and that the relationship is 
linear. It is important to study the residual plot as the regression model is only useful if 
the following Regression Analysis assumptions are not violated. 
1. Residuals are independent 
2. Residuals are normally distributed. 
3. Residuals have a mean of zero. 
4. Residuals have a constant variance. 
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The last plot on the right of Figure 14 shows a non-linear model (Hayter 2012).   
 
Figure 14.  Type of Regression Plots. 
2. Partition Tree Analysis 
As explained in Chapter XIII of the JMP Manual, “Modeling and Multivariate 
Methods”,  unlike regression analysis that requires the residuals to be normally 
distributed for the model to be useful, partition tree analysis is non-parametric, which 
means it does not require any distributional assumptions of the data. Partition tree 
analysis is often used to complement the results of regression. It is a good for exploring 
relationships between a dependent variable and its independent variables (Cary 2012).  
The data set used is recursively partitioned into groups of independent variables X 
values and identifies the group(s) that best predicts the value of the dependent variable Y, 
forming a tree-like chart as presented in Figure 15. The creation of the partition tree starts 
from the top. At the top branch, the most significant dependent variable is identified, and 
the R2 based on this variable is also computed. Moving down the tree, the next most 
significant dependent variable is identified, and when both variables are used to predict 
the dependent variable, the R2 value increases. The process of identifying the next 
significant dependent variable is called splitting. Splitting is performed recursively until 
the tree cannot be grown further, meaning there are no other significant dependent 
variables that can be used to predict the value of the dependent variable Y. At this point, 
the R2 is the highest. Additional information that the partition tree presents is the 
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threshold value for each significant dependent variable, its mean, standard deviation, and 
the count of occurrence that is less than, or greater than, and equal to the threshold value.  
 
Figure 15.  Sample Partition Tree (from Gary NC 2012). 
H. SENSOR ATTRIBUTES   
The scope of this thesis focuses on the sensing capability of ground platforms’ 
survivability during maneuver operations. Only sensor attributes of Blue forces will be 
varied, as the focus is on improving Blue forces’ survivability. Varying Red forces’ 
sensor attributes adds complexity to the analysis and might dilute the significance of the 
Blue forces’ sensor attributes that are being studied. 
1. List of Sensor Attributes 
Sensor attributes that seem to affect sensing capability are: (1) Target Detection, 
(2) Target Classification, (3) Target Identification, (4) Sensor Field of View, and lastly, 
(5) Speed of UAV. Target Detection is the discovery of a potential target during area 
scanning. The factors that affect detection are: Range, Probability, and Average 
Processing Time to Detect. Target Classification is the ability to recognize the type of 
target that has been detected. The factors that affect classification are: Range, Probability, 
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and Average Processing Time to classify after detection. Target Identification is the 
ability to determine whether the target classified is a friend or a foe. The factors that 
affect identification are: Probability and Average Processing Time to identify after 
classification. Sensor Field of View is the angular area that can be seen within the 
observable angle of the sensor at any given time.  
The listed attributes can be varied in the MANA software except for target 
identification, detection probability, and average processing time to classify because 
features to vary these three attributes are not available in MANA. Each type of Blue 
platform has its own unique sensor attributes. The sensing capability for Bradley-ATGM 
and M6 Linebackers is assumed to be the same for ease of fleet configuration 
management since the baseline platform for both are Bradley IFV. Table 6 presents the 
list of 22 factors that can be varied to study the effects of sensing capability on platform 
survivability. The factors studied are the attributes of the lower level functions of the 
Maneuver Ground Force function as described in Table 1. Mapping these factors to their 
respective functions, and presenting them in Table 6, provides traceability of the factors 
chosen. This facilitates the verification of the relationship between the factors and the 












Table 6.   List of Factors Available for Sensing Effects Study. 





Raven UAV Range Average Processing time to detect 
M1A2 
Abrams Range 
Average Processing time to 
detect 
Bradley Range Average Processing time to detect 
Stryker-
ATGM Range 






Raven UAV Range Probability 
M1A2 
Abrams Range Probability 
Bradley Range Probability 
Stryker-






Raven UAV FOV Angle 
M1A2 
Abrams FOV Angle 
Bradley FOV Angle 
Stryker-
ATGM FOV Angle 
UAV Speed 1.1.Navigate Route Raven UAV Speed 




2. Sensor Attributes Studied 
For agents to engage an opponent, they must be able to classify their opponent 
before they can fire on it. The detection range and classification of sighting systems are 
designed to match, if not exceed, the weapons systems engagement range. This implies 
that even when the agent is able to “see” its opponent, the agent would not be able to 
engage if the opponent agent is out of its weapon engagement range. It is noted that 
having the ability to “see” its opponent beyond its engagement range allows an agent to 
take evasive actions or use other battle tactics to avoid or destroy its opponent. Since the 
focus of this study is not on battle tactics but on technology, the following factors will be 
studied to analyze their effects on ground platform survivability during maneuver 
operations: 
1. Probability of classification at maximum classification range (Range: 0.5 
to 0.85) 
The probability of classification determines probability of classification at 
every scan. High probability means a higher chance of classification at 
first scan, which implies shorter classification time. 
2. UAV’s speed (Range: 31 km/hr to 81 km/hr (AeroVironment 2014)) 
How fast the UAV can return to the previous scanned area affects the 
effectiveness of the aerial surveillance. Red forces might appear after the 
UAV flies out of its sensor detection zone to engaged Blue forces. When 
this happens, artillery support cannot be activated, and ground platforms 
might not be able to see Red forces that are not within their line of sight. 
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V. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A well-designed experiment allows the analyst to examine many more factors than would 
otherwise be possible, while providing insights that could not be gleaned from trial-and-
error approaches or by sampling factors one at a time. (Sanchez, 2005). 
 
The objective of Design of Experiment (DOE) is to maximize the amount of 
information from a given number of simulation runs that can help the analyst understand 
the system modeled. It is a systematic approach to gather meaning from data points of the 
system’s performance by varying the values of a set of independent variables (factors) 
which have effects on performance. A good DOE identifies a set of simulation runs that 
helps the analyst learn about the model in an efficient manner, without missing any 
important combinations or design points or wasting resources by simulating redundant 
runs. The number of simulation runs depends on the number factors and the DOE 
methodologies used. While there are various DOE methodologies that can be used, the 
nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) is used in this thesis. 
A. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE 
NOLH is a statistical method that has good space-filling properties of a factorial 
design even though it uses a lesser number of design points to study the effects of factors 
on system performance. Good space-filling designs have design points spread throughout 
the entire design region with minimal unsampled spaces within the region. 
Susan Sanchez, from the Operations Research (OR) Department at NPS, explains 
the difference between factorial design and Latin Hypercube in a very concise and easy-
to-understand manner in her paper. Figure 16 depicts the difference between factorial 
design and Latin Hypercube sampling. Using the factorial approach, two factors each 
with two levels (the low and high extreme values) will result in four design points (22). 
When the number of levels increases to 11, there will be 121 design points (112). Using 
the Latin Hypercube sampling approach, 11 design points would be adequate for an 
analyst to study the effects of the factors on system’s performance (Sanchez 2005).  
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Figure 16.  Comparison between Full Factorial Approach and Latin Hypercube 
(from Sanchez 2005). 
Latin Hypercube designs have a good orthogonality. Orthogonality means the 
design points are independent, and the results of one design point will not be dependent 
on the other design points. Orthogonality is determined by comparing the pairwise 
correlation value of two factors, and the correlation values are between -1 to 1. A “0” 
means no correlation between the two factors, and a “+/- 1” implies perfect linear 
correlation. It is desirable for the correlation value between factors to be as close to “0” 
as possible to achieve orthogonality. The guideline to determine orthogonality is 
correlation value less than +/-0.03 (Cioppa and Lucas, 2007). Furthermore, according to 
the author’s discussion with Professor Thomas W. Lucas of the OR Department at NPS, 
+/- 0.05 is also acceptable. The independence of each design point facilitates the 
discovery of the effects that each factor has on a system’s performance.  
Latin Hypercube design generates a set of design points at random. One common 
approach when Latin Hypercube design is used is to generate multiple Latin Hypercube 
designs and identify a good one for further analysis. Thomas M. Cioppa, from the U.S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center, and Lucas, from the OR 
department in NPS, developed the NOLH designs used in this study in Microsoft Excel. 
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This NOLHdesigns.xls excel spreadsheet2 allows the analyst to specify the factors, and 
the low and high levels of each factor, which immediately outputs a set of NOLH designs 
that have good space-filling and orthogonality properties. The spreadsheet contains five 
different worksheets, and each worksheet generates a specific number of design points 
for specific ranges of number of factors. Table 7 presents the details of the five types of 
NOLH designs available. 
Table 7.   Available NOLH Designs. 
No. of design 
factors 
No. of design 
points generated 
2 to 7 17 
8 to 11 33 
12 to 16 65 
17 to 22 129 
23 to 29 257 
 
When more design points are used, the orthogonality of the set of NOLH designs 
improves. Increasing the number of design points is a good technique to improve the 
orthogonality when the input factors have relatively small ranges of low and high levels. 
Such factors typically have higher pairwise correlation, resulting in less orthogonality.  
B. DESIGN POINTS GENERATED FOR SIMULATION   
The factors studied in this thesis are the UAV speed and sensor classification 
probability at maximum classification range for the UAV, Abrams MBT, Bradley IIFVs, 
and Stryker ICVs. The range of values to be varied for the five factors is presented in 
Table 8. 
  
2 The NOLHdesigns.xls Excel spreadsheet can be downloaded from the NPS Seed Center’s data 
farming website at http://harvest.nps.edu/, 
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Table 8.   Design Factor Details. 





UAV speed 32 kph 81 kph According to Raven 
operating speed range 
(AeroVironment 2014). 
UAV sensor classification 
probability at maximum 
classification range 
0.5 0.85 It is assumed that at 
maximum classification 
range, the probability of 
classification ranges 
between 0.5 and 0.85, as 
the highest probability of 
classification is usually 
not at the maximum 
range. 
Abrams MBT sensor 
classification probability at 
maximum classification range 
0.5 0.85 
Bradley IFV sensor classification 
probability at maximum 
classification range 
0.5 0.85 
Stryker ICV sensor classification 




The set of design points generated using version 6 of the NOLH spreadsheet 
(Sanchez 2011) is presented in Figure 17. Although only five factors are being studied, 
the 8-to-11 factors NOLH worksheet that generates 33 design points was used. There is 
no need to intentionally increase the number of factors from five to eight, or to 11. Five 
factors still work perfectly well when the 8-to-11 factors NOLH worksheet is used. Those 
columns that are not used can be left blank as each column is independent of the others.  
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Figure 17.  NOLH Design for Ground Force Maneuver Operation Analysis. 
The set of design points is analyzed using JMP PRO V10 (JMP) software to 
verify that the space-filling properties and orthogonality are within acceptable threshold 
levels before the simulation runs are carried. Figure 18 and Figure 19 present the two-
dimensional Correlation Matrix and Scatter Plot Matrix generated in JMP. The 
Correlation Matrix was recreated in Microsoft Excel as the JMP-generated Correlation 
Matrix is not so readable.  
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The correlation values presented in the Correlation Matrix are known as Pearson 
Correlation Coefficients (Corr), which are computed using the following equation 
(Hayter 2012). 
 
Corr (X,Y) = Pearson Correlation and Cov(X,Y) = Covariance of XY, where X and Y 
represents the two factors that are being compared. 
 
The Correlation Matrix presents the results of the pairwise correlation of all five 
factors, and all the correlation values are within the +/- 0.05 guideline. From the Scatter 
Plot Matrix, there is also no large empty region observed. 
 
Figure 18.  Factors Correlation Matrix. 
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Figure 19.  Scatter Plot Matrix. 
Outcomes from the Correlation Matrix and Scatter Plot Matrix verify that the set 
of NOLH-created design points has achieved good space-filling properties and 
orthogonality. With the set of design points determined, the next step is to perform 
simulation runs and gather results for further analysis. 
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VI. RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results obtained from simulation runs of 33 design 
points. Each design point simulation was repeated for 50 replications, and a total of 1650 
data points were collected and analyzed. Details of the full results can be found in 
Appendix A. The number of Blue casualties, probability of mission success, and time to 
complete mission are the three MANA-generated results being measured.  
The results for number of Blue casualties were further processed to obtain the 
percentage of Blue casualties. Variability in the results indicates that the factors (UAV 
Speed and Sensor Classification Probability at maximum classification range of various 
platforms) have effects on the survivability of the ground maneuver forces.  
A. PERCENTAGE OF BLUE CASUALTIES 
Variability can be observed from the distribution plots for percentage of Blue 
casualties. The percentage of Blue casualties observed vary from 2.6 to 97.4 percent, 
which indicates that the factors do have an effect. See Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.  Percentage Blue Casualties. 
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B. PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS 
For a fight-to-the-finish simulation, mission success is achieved when the last 
Blue agent reaches the destination, regardless of the number of Blue forces remaining. It 
is observed that the mean probability of mission success for the 1,650 simulation is close 
to 0.979, and there is little variability in the results. It is also observed that the Red forces 
are totally annihilated for most of the runs, which explains the high probability of mission 
success.  
However, it is not realistic for a ground maneuver force to fight until the last 
platform. A retreat would most likely be initiated after suffering an attrition of more than 
50 percent (hypothetical percentage). Therefore, the data collected was further processed 
to consider mission success, if the remaining force size upon reaching the destination is 
more than 50 percent. The mean mission success rate decreases to about 87.2 percent. 
However, again not much variability is observed. Therefore, this implies that the factors 
studied do not have any significant effect on the probability of mission success.   
C. TIME TO COMPLETE MISSION 
Results for the time to complete mission (fight-to-the-finish) is presented in 
Figure 21. For the distribution plot, little variation is observed, and the mean mission 
completion time is about 4,016 seconds (~1.2 hours). The minimal variation implies that 
the factors have no significant effect on the time to complete mission. 
 
Figure 21.  Time to Complete Mission. 
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The results will be further analyzed in the next chapter to identify the significant 
factors that affect platform survivability. 
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VII. DATA ANALYSIS 
Two types of data analysis will be presented in this chapter: regression analysis 
and partition tree analysis. These two analyses identify the significant factors that affect 
the percentage of Blue casualties, which reflects the survivability of the ground maneuver 
force. The mean of percentage of Blue casualties from 50 replications, each of the 33 
simulation design points, are used for both analyses. 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Residual analysis is first performed to determine the usefulness of the regression 
model. The Residual by Predicted plot shows randomness, indicating that the four 
assumptions for regression analysis (as described in Section G.1) are not violated, and 
that the regression model is a useful model. See Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22.  Residual by Predicted Plot. 
The main effects, two-way interactions, and second order polynomials of the 
factors are being analyzed for the regression model. The stepwise regression analysis 
performed is shown in Figure 23. This analysis is a function in JMP that automatically 
identifies the significant terms (main effects, two-way interactions, and second order 
polynomials) and omits the rest that are insignificant to the percentage of Blue casualties 
to develop the regression model. Five terms have been identified to have significant 
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effects on percentage of Blue casualty: (1) IFV sensor classification probability, (2) MBT 
sensor classification probability, (3) UAV Speed * UAV speed, (4) IFV sensor 
classification probability * IFV sensor classification probability, and (5) UAV speed. 
Classification probability refers to the probability at the sensors maximum classification 
range. The five terms have p-values less than 0.05, and factors that have p-values less 
than 0.05 are classified as significant factors. When p-values of factors are low, the null 
hypotheses that the factors do not have any significance are rejected.  
 
Figure 23.  Stepwise Regression Analysis. 
The five terms are subsequently used to create the regression model, and Figure 
24 presents the Actual by Predict plot. The Actual by Predicted plot shows how well the 
regression model fits the actual data collected. The solid line represents the regression 
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model, and the dots represent the data, mean percentage of Blue casualties, collected 
from the simulation runs. The better the dots fit to the regression model, the better the 
regression model is able to explain the variation in percentage of Blue casualties. It is 
observed that most of the data fell within the two boundaries. The R2 of this regression 
model is 0.769, implying that about 76.9 percent of the variation in responses (percentage 
Blue casualties) can be explained by this regression model.  
 
Figure 24.  Actual by Predicted Plot for Regression Model. 
The effects analysis presented in Figure 25 presents the five significant terms of 
the regression model, in order of significance: (1) IFV sensor classification probability, 
(2) MBT sensor classification probability, (3) UAV Speed * UAV Speed, (4) IFV sensor 
classification probability * IFV sensor classification probability, (5) UAV speed.   
The Pareto chart on the right of Figure 25 shows that increasing IFV sensor 
classification probability has the greatest effect on percentage of Blue casualty reduction. 
This could be due to the ability of the Bradley M6-Linebacker to destroy Red force attack 
helicopters more effectively, as attack helicopters are effective in destroying ground 
platforms. However, its second order polynomial term shows that the increase in 
probability would increase the casualty percentage to only a smaller extent. This 
characteristic is also represented in the prediction profiler plot for mean percentage of 
Blue casualties against IFV sensor classification probability. It is observed that when IFV 
sensor classification increases to beyond approximately 0.78, the percentage of Blue 
casualties starts to increase.  
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MBT sensor classification probability has the next highest effect in reducing the 
percentage of Blue casualties, and increasing sensor classification probability increases 
the MBT’s lethality, enabling the platform to kill more adversaries. 
UAV speed has the least effect in reducing the percentage of Blue casualties 
among the five terms identified. The second order polynomial term of UAV speed shows 
that increased speed causes the percentage of Blue casualties to increase. One possible 
reason could be due to the shorter duration to process the video transferred from the UAV 
to headquarters, and that might have resulted in the target to miss being detected. From 
the prediction profile plot for UAV speed, the maximum speed that gives the lowest Blue 
casualty percentage is approximately 60 km/hr. At higher speeds, the percentage of Blue 
casualties increases. 
 
Figure 25.  Effects Analysis and Prediction Profiler. 
An analysis of the simulation results of design point 17 (least percentage of Blue 
casualties) and design point 21 (highest percentage of Blue casualties) is shown in Figure 
26. The analysis on the Blue casualties profile for both design points revealed that most 
of the Blue force casualties are suffered by the first team of the ground maneuver force. 
The mean number of Blue casualties for the first team ranges from two to three for each 
of the three types of platforms, indicating more than 50 percent of the first team is killed 
by the Red forces. From the Red force killing profile, the attack helicopters are the most 
dangerous threat, as they kill the highest number of Blue agents. The high rate of Blue 
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casualties in the first team is due to successful engagements by the Red attack 
helicopters.  
The regression model identifies that the IFV sensor classification probability of as 
the most significant factor. The Bradley-M6 Linebacker has the air defense capability to 
destroy attack helicopters. A higher sensor classification probability for the M6 
Linebackers means a higher chance of destroying the adversary attack helicopters first. 
By eliminating the main threat, the number of Blue casualties would be reduced. This 
illustrates the importance of having air defense assets for ground maneuver forces as 
ground platforms are highly vulnerable to air attacks, more so when there is no 
information on adversary force structure.  
 
Figure 26.  Analysis on Data Obtained for Design Point 17 and Design Point 21. 
 69 
The next most significant factor is the sensor classification probability at 
maximum sensor classification of the MBTs. The MBT’s 120 mm main gun can destroy 
most of the Red forces ground platforms, and has the longest ground engagement range 
compared to the rest of the ground platforms studied in this thesis. A higher sensor 
classification probability increases the chance of the MBT engaging adversaries first. 
This finding suggests that upgrading the MBT’s sensor system is more effective in 
destroying adversary ground platforms, and as suggested by the regression model, there is 
no need to upgrade the sensing capability of the Stryker-ICVs. Upgrading the MBT’s 
sensing capability improves its own and the entire ground maneuver force’s survivability.  
UAV speed is identified to be a significant factor that affects ground platform 
survivability. Increasing UAV speed shortens the duration before it returns to the last 
scanned location. This reduces the chances of “missing” a target after passing through a 
surveillance zone. However, it is not realistic to increase a UAV’s speed indefinitely as 
that could decrease the endurance of the UAV, as well as the quality of image transfer.  
Interestingly, the Stryker ICV’s sensor classification probability at maximum 
sensor classification range has no effect on the survivability on the ground maneuver 
forces. This is probably due to the MBTs being more effective in destroying most of the 
Red agents first.   
B. PARTITION TREE ANALYSIS 
The R2 value obtained from partition tree analysis is 0.777, indicating that the 
partition tree model explains 77.7 percent of the variability in the response (percentage 
Blue casualties). This is the highest achievable R2 value obtained after performing four 
splits. The significant factors identified (in order of significance) are: (1) IFV sensor 
classification probability, (2) MBT sensor classification probability, and (3) UAV speed. 
It is also observed that mean percentage of Blue casualties is lower when IFV sensor 
classification probability is greater than or equal to 0.62, MBT sensor classification 
probability is greater than or equal to 0.64, and UAV speed is greater than or equal to 57 
km/hr. Results from the partition tree analysis compares favorably to the results obtained 
from regression analysis with an R2 value of 0.769. The threshold values obtained from 
partition tree analysis could be used as a reference for determining the degree of 
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improvement that is required. The other insights obtained from the partition tree analysis 
are similar to those of regression analysis as both analyses identified the same factors in 
the same order of significance. Figure 27 presents the partition tree. 
 
Figure 27.  Partition Tree Analysis. 
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C. ANALYSES SUMMARY 
Both the regression analysis for (main effects, two-way interactions, and second 
order polynomial of the factors) and the partition tree analysis identify the same 
significant factors with similar R2 values of 0.769 and 0.777, respectively. This 
consistency in results verified the correctness of the simulation performed. A summary of 
the analyses is presented in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Table Analysis Summary. 
Significant Factors (in order of importance) 
Regression Analysis (R2 =0.769) Partition Tree Analysis (R2 = 0.777) 
IFV Sensor Classification Probability IFV Sensor Classification Probability 
MBT Sensor Classification Probability MBT Sensor Classification Probability 
(UAV Speed)2 UAV Speed 
(IFV sensor classification probability)2  
UAV Speed  
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The true performance parameters (weapon engagement range, weapon penetration 
capability, armor protection thickness, probability of hit, etc.) of systems modeled in this 
thesis are usually classified. Hence, the parameters of the agents modeled are based on 
open source references—theses, online reading material, and product brochures—and 
may not represent the true capability of the systems. The observations and findings based 
on the MANA scenario created and assumptions made might not reflect what could have 
happened in the real world. Therefore, the results obtained are only limited to the scope 
of this thesis. However, this systems engineering approach, using the tailored Waterfall 
process model, identified and opened up different plausible areas to improve platform 
survivability—other than focusing on improving the passive protection of ground 
platforms. The results and findings can be used as references for future work. 
A. INSIGHTS 
Results of the analysis resemble the outcomes in real maneuver operations. This 
section describes the insights from the analysis and highlights the importance of 
performing modeling and simulation. Modeling and simulation provide insights to 
engineers and decision makers on the feasibility of concepts and provide quantitative 
values for decision makers’ reference.   
1. Air Defense Capability for Ground Maneuver Forces 
Ground maneuver forces are highly susceptible to airborne attacks. It is observed 
through simulation runs that attack helicopters are very effective in engaging ground 
forces. The effectiveness is due to the helicopters’ longer sensing and engaging ranges, 
which makes them less vulnerable to return fire from ground platforms that typically 
have shorter sensing and engagement ranges. Therefore, if resources are available, 
ground maneuver forces should try to include air defense assets in the maneuver force to 
improve their survivability. Regression analysis and partition analysis both identify the 
classification probability at maximum classification range of both the Bradley IFV, M6 
Linebacker and ATGM variants, as the most significant factor affecting the ground 
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platform’s survivability. The higher the probability of classifying a target, the faster the 
M6 Bradley can engage the attack helicopters first. One important finding is that the 
partition tree analysis is able to identify a threshold value for the decision maker’s 
reference and consideration in determining a target probability to be achieved. With 
actual performance parameters assigned to the Blue agents, the results can be a good 
reference for decision makers. 
The Abrams MBTs are capable of engaging helicopters as well. However, when 
compared to the Bradley M6 Linebackers, the Abrams are not as effective because their 
weapon engagement range is shorter than that of the attack helicopters. These findings 
may be obvious as it is logical for ground maneuver forces to have air defense capability. 
However, the question is: how many air defense assets are required? Modeling and 
simulation can provide a reference quantitative figure for decision makers on this point. 
The MANA model created can be a baseline model for the analysts to vary platform 
configurations to determine an appropriate number of air assets.  
It is also noted that in the absence of enemy air platforms, the presence of an M6 
Bradley would be less significant in improving ground maneuver forces’ survivability. 
Nonetheless, having the M6 Bradley as part of the ground maneuver force is a show of 
force that can deter adversaries from launching their air platforms. 
2. Presence of Main Battle Tanks   
The MBT is one of the most important assets in ground maneuver forces. This is 
due to their long weapon engagement range and their high level of protection against 
incoming threats. Most often, the MBTs provide ground maneuver forces with protection 
against adversaries’ ground platforms by engaging them first, protecting the platforms 
protected by less armor. The results indicate that the MBT’s sensor classification 
probability at maximum classification is the next most significant factor. The results 
indicate that it is not necessary to upgrade the sensing capability for all types of 
platforms. For example, the regression model and partition tree analysis indicate that 
upgrading the sensing capability of the Sryker platforms have little effect in improving 
ground maneuver forces survivability. To improve the ground maneuvering forces’ 
survivability, the priority should be on upgrading MBTs first, followed by the rest of the 
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platforms. This is something decision makers would not know without performing 
modeling and simulation. When a program to upgrade sensor capabilities for ground 
platforms encounters a budget reduction, decision makers must determine which platform 
should be given priority based on quantitative results from simulation runs. 
3. Presence of Unmanned Air Vehicles  
UAVs can be a valuable asset to ground maneuver forces. The UAVs act as 
“sensors” for the ground forces, providing them with information, such as terrain features 
and adversary locations, along the maneuver route. Interestingly the important parameter 
of the UAV is not the probability of success classification, but UAV speed instead. The 
speed of the UAV affects the time interval before returning to the same scan zone. There 
could be instances where Red agents appear after the UAV leaves its last detectable zone. 
Regression model and partition tree analysis identified UAV speed as a more important 
factor when compared to sensor classification probability. This outcome is probably 
because the UAV’s flight route is a randomly plotted circular route. The scanning pattern 
of the UAV can varied to identify the most efficient route, which could reduce the effect 
on UAV speed, and plausibly reveal other more significant factors of the UAV that could 
improve ground maneuver forces survivability during maneuver operations. Other 
limitations in the UAV modeled include assumptions, such as 100 percent 
communication reliability and absence of electronic warfare. In reality, adversaries might 
employ jammers to disrupt communications between the UAVs and ground forces, 
delaying or preventing critical battle information from reaching ground forces.    
B. FUTURE RESEARCH   
The arms race between lethality and protection is an enduring challenge. 
Whenever new protection systems are developed, new weapons and munition will be 
developed to defeat the protection systems, and vice versa. This repetitive cycle 
seemingly never ends.  
There are many other avenues to improve platform survivability, which are not 
only limited to increasing armor thickness. The proactive approach on the other end 
focuses on eliminating the source of the threats first, preventing the threats reaching 
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ground platforms. This study shows that adopting a proactive approach is an area worth 
exploring as the results show positive effects in improving ground platforms’ 
survivability.  
It is acknowledged that this study is not exhaustive. However, it can be a starting 
point for future research, which has the potential of finding other alternatives, and 
reduces the burden to enhance existing protection systems to improve ground platforms’ 
survivability. 
(1) Study on Effectiveness of Unmanned Air Vehicles 
The UAV is an important asset to ground maneuver forces. One interesting area to 
be explored would be developing an effective method to launch and retrieve UAVs by 
ground maneuver forces “on-the-fly”. As pointed out in this study, UAVs play an 
important role as additional sensors for ground platforms in improving battle field 
situation awareness. The travel distance by ground platforms in this study is only about 
20 km. For longer distances, UAVs launched from base would not be able to provide 
coverage. Developing a method that allows UAVs to be launched “on-the-fly” would be 
beneficial to ground maneuver forces. 
(2) Study on Effects of Terrain Elevation 
The other possible area of research is to incorporate terrain elevation features into 
the MANA scenario to study the effects of sensor classification probability, sensor 
detection range, and other sensor attributes. With elevation features added, line of sight of 
sensors would be affected, and the study could lead to other discoveries.   
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APPENDIX A. DATA VERIFICATION TEST RESULTS 
SUMMARY 
The first verification is a simulation run observation. Observing the agents during 
simulation runs allows us to check whether they are responding to different situations 
according to their behavior attributes. The visual inspection checklist is presented in 
Table 10. 
Table 10.   Model Verification ‒ Visual Observation Checklist. 
Behavior 





Blue agents’ movements follow way points. √ 
Blue agents maneuver in correct formation. √ 
Blue agents’ speed reduced when contacted. √ 
Red agents move toward Blue agent during 
engagement. √ 
Blue UAV hovering near to red forces when detected. √ 
Red Helicopters’ movement follow way points √ 
Communication 
Settings 
Blue UAV communicates to Blue artillery when Red 
agents are detected. √ 
Red FO communicates to Red mortar when Blue agents 
are detected. √ 
Engagement 
Settings 




Red agents are in 100% concealment before they take 
shot at Blue agents. √ 
Blue UAV cannot detect red agents before they take 
shot at blue agents. √ 
Blue UAV can detect red agents when they take shot at 
Blue agents. √ 
Sensor Settings 
Using the “View Squad Situation Awareness” feature to 
check whether agents can detect each other when they 
are in their sensing ranges. 
√ 
 
The second verification is to check the data generated by MANA to verify 
whether the agents are behaving correctly during engagement. Fifty simulation runs on 
the model created were simulated, and the data set generated was used for verification.  
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A snapshot of the casualty location file for a single simulation run is presented in 
Figure 28. The Cas Squad column (agents killed) is compared against the Sqd name 
column (Killer agents), and checked against the killer victim matrix to verify the 
correctness of engagement. The Agent State column is checked to verify that the agents 
are in the correct trigger state. The Weapon Class column and Weapon ID column are 
checked to verify that the right type of weapon is used by the “killer” agent on the 
casualty. In MANA, each weapon is set to engage a specific class of platforms. Lastly, 
the Shooter Alleg column is checked to verify that there is no collateral damage as per set 
in the model (1 = Blue Agent, 2 = Red Agent). Location of casualties and shooters, 
denoted by x-casualty and y casualty, and x-shooter and y-shooter respectively are not 
checked as they are not representative of the agents’ behavior. 
The data verification test verifies that the model is created correctly as there is no 
abnormality in the data captured and generated by MANA.  
 
Figure 28.  Model Verification ‒ Data Inspection. 
Positive results from the two types of model verification tests verify that the 
model is modeled correctly, and the model is ready for further simulations. 
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APPENDIX B. DESIGN POINTS SIMULATION RESULTS 
SUMMARY 
The results of the simulation runs for the 33 design points identified using the 
NOLH design of experiments methodology are summarized in Table 11. A total of eight 
performance parameters are being studied, and the mean, standard deviation, and 95 
percent lower and upper confidence of the mean of 50 replications are being tabulated. 
JMP is the statistical program used to generate the results. The eight performance 
parameters are: 
1. Number of Blue casualties (Blue Cas) 
2. Percentage of Blue casualties (% Blue Cas) 
3. Number of Red casualties (Red Cas) 
4. Exchange Ratio (Kill Ratio) 
5. Force Exchange Ratio (FER) 
6. Number of times Blue completes mission for fight-to-finish scenario (Blue 
Goal, Fight-to-the-finish) 
7. Number of times Blue completes mission with casualties suffered less than 
50 percent (Blue Goal, Casualty < 50%) 
8. Time to complete mission (time to complete mission) 
The distribution plots of individual design points in this appendix provide 
additional information, such as box plots, occurrences at different quantiles, and standard 
error mean and median of each design points.  
The distribution plots for Exchange Ratio and Force Exchange Ratio are also 
included. Both performance parameters present a high standard deviation. This is 
attributed to the variability in number of Blue casualties, as the number of Red casualties 
for each design point is almost constant with values of either 18 or 19. Since the 
variability is largely due to Blue casualties, the focus would be on analyzing Blue 
casualties. Therefore, the Exchange Ratio and Force Exchange Ratio are not studied in 
great detail in this thesis.   
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Table 11.   Results for Simulation Runs for 33 Design Points. 
 
























































1 81 0.65 0.57 0.81 0.72 11.52 7.237 9.46 13.57 0.303 0.190 0.249 0.357 17.98 0.141 17.90 18.20 2.46 2.071 1.87 3.05
2 76 0.54 0.63 0.66 0.57 11.58 7.077 9.57 13.59 0.305 0.186 0.252 0.358 18.98 0.141 18.94 19.02 2.33 1.514 1.90 2.76
3 75 0.82 0.55 0.51 0.71 14.14 8.127 11.83 16.45 0.372 0.214 0.311 0.433 18.88 0.480 18.74 19.02 1.90 1.471 1.48 2.32
4 60 0.85 0.64 0.83 0.55 9.36 5.198 7.90 10.86 0.247 0.137 0.208 0.286 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.96 2.902 2.14 3.79
5 78 0.66 0.58 0.74 0.75 10.56 6.609 8.68 12.44 0.278 0.174 0.228 0.327 18.96 0.283 18.88 19.04 3.00 3.561 1.99 4.01
6 79 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.58 12.46 7.034 10.46 14.46 0.328 0.185 0.275 0.381 18.98 0.141 18.94 19.02 2.28 1.945 1.73 2.83
7 66 0.84 0.59 0.50 0.73 13.18 8.975 10.63 15.73 0.347 0.236 0.280 0.414 18.94 0.240 18.87 19.01 2.55 2.953 1.71 3.39
8 58 0.83 0.62 0.82 0.59 9.98 7.260 7.92 12.04 0.263 0.191 0.208 0.317 18.60 2.688 17.84 19.36 3.19 2.997 2.33 4.04
9 64 0.58 0.69 0.75 0.61 10.24 6.811 8.30 12.18 0.269 0.179 0.218 0.321 18.68 2.123 18.07 19.28 2.78 2.104 2.18 3.38
10 69 0.60 0.74 0.58 0.69 10.48 6.463 8.84 12.32 0.276 0.170 0.233 0.324 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.71 2.080 2.12 3.31
11 67 0.76 0.84 0.62 0.52 9.58 5.191 8.10 11.06 0.252 0.137 0.213 0.291 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.54 1.289 2.18 2.91
12 70 0.73 0.83 0.76 0.84 9.88 7.300 7.81 11.95 0.260 0.192 0.206 0.314 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 3.17 2.900 2.34 3.99
13 61 0.57 0.70 0.71 0.54 9.96 6.224 8.19 11.73 0.262 0.164 0.216 0.309 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 3.15 3.627 2.12 4.18
14 73 0.63 0.81 0.55 0.70 12.32 7.649 10.15 14.49 0.324 0.201 0.267 0.381 18.94 0.424 18.82 19.06 2.25 1.659 1.77 2.72
15 63 0.80 0.82 0.63 0.50 10.46 7.869 8.22 12.70 0.275 0.207 0.216 0.334 18.88 0.849 18.64 19.12 3.31 3.655 2.27 4.35
16 72 0.71 0.85 0.78 0.82 8.66 5.025 7.23 10.09 0.228 0.132 0.190 0.266 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 3.19 2.714 2.42 3.96
17 57 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 8.12 4.945 6.73 9.55 0.214 0.130 0.177 0.251 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 3.65 3.679 2.60 4.69
18 32 0.70 0.78 0.54 0.63 13.50 8.744 11.03 16.01 0.356 0.230 0.290 0.421 18.94 0.240 18.87 19.01 2.47 2.889 1.64 3.29
19 37 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.78 11.70 7.514 9.56 13.84 0.308 0.198 0.252 0.364 18.98 0.141 18.93 19.02 2.43 1.870 1.90 2.96
20 38 0.53 0.80 0.84 0.64 10.44 7.332 8.36 12.52 0.275 0.193 0.220 0.329 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 3.25 3.281 2.31 4.18
21 53 0.50 0.71 0.52 0.80 15.20 9.714 12.44 17.96 0.400 0.256 0.327 0.473 18.92 0.444 18.79 19.05 2.04 1.602 1.59 2.50
22 35 0.69 0.77 0.61 0.60 12.62 7.830 10.40 14.85 0.332 0.206 0.274 0.391 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.74 3.659 1.70 3.78
23 34 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.77 11.22 6.212 9.45 12.99 0.295 0.163 0.249 0.342 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.49 1.916 1.94 3.03
24 47 0.51 0.76 0.85 0.62 10.50 5.437 8.95 12.05 0.276 0.143 0.236 0.317 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.84 3.134 1.95 3.74
25 55 0.52 0.73 0.53 0.76 11.28 6.390 9.48 13.12 0.297 0.168 0.249 0.345 18.98 0.141 18.94 19.02 2.57 2.722 1.79 3.34
26 49 0.77 0.66 0.60 0.74 12.98 6.924 11.01 14.95 0.342 0.182 0.290 0.393 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.04 1.543 1.60 2.47
27 44 0.75 0.61 0.77 0.66 10.80 5.393 9.29 12.35 0.285 0.142 0.244 0.325 18.98 0.141 18.94 19.02 2.46 2.629 1.72 3.21
28 46 0.59 0.51 0.73 0.83 10.28 6.433 8.45 12.11 0.271 0.169 0.222 0.319 18.94 0.240 18.87 19.01 2.88 2.949 2.04 3.72
29 43 0.62 0.52 0.59 0.51 14.06 8.105 11.76 16.36 0.370 0.213 0.309 0.431 18.84 0.681 18.65 19.03 1.96 1.692 1.48 2.45
30 52 0.78 0.65 0.64 0.81 9.82 5.965 8.12 11.52 0.258 0.157 0.214 0.303 18.86 0.990 18.58 19.14 2.66 1.696 2.18 3.14
31 40 0.72 0.54 0.80 0.65 12.08 6.067 10.36 13.80 0.318 0.160 0.273 0.363 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.44 2.838 1.63 3.24
32 50 0.55 0.53 0.72 0.85 11.14 6.132 9.42 12.90 0.294 0.161 0.248 0.339 19.00 0.000 19.00 19.00 2.65 2.963 1.80 3.49
33 41 0.64 0.50 0.57 0.53 15.12 8.248 12.78 17.46 0.398 0.217 0.336 0.459 18.86 0.729 18.65 19.07 2.01 2.680 1.24 2.77
Classification Probability (0.5 to 0.85) @ 
Maximum Classify Range
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1 81 0.65 0.57 0.81 0.72 4.67 3.934 3.55 5.79 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.84 0.370 0.73 0.95 3904.88 81.73 3881.65 3928.11
2 76 0.54 0.63 0.66 0.57 4.43 2.877 3.61 5.25 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.84 0.370 0.73 0.95 4036.84 861.17 3792.10 4281.58
3 75 0.82 0.55 0.51 0.71 3.61 2.795 2.81 4.40 0.94 0.240 0.87 1.00 0.78 0.418 0.66 0.90 4150.98 1207.40 3807.84 4494.12
4 60 0.85 0.64 0.83 0.55 5.62 5.514 4.19 4.06 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 3924.26 37.52 3913.60 3934.92
5 78 0.66 0.58 0.74 0.75 5.70 6.766 3.78 7.63 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.303 0.81 0.99 3921.88 44.12 3909.34 3934.42
6 79 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.58 4.33 3.695 3.28 5.38 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.86 0.351 0.76 0.96 3905.44 52.40 3890.55 3920.33
7 66 0.84 0.59 0.50 0.73 4.85 5.610 3.25 6.45 0.92 0.274 0.84 0.99 0.80 0.404 0.69 0.91 4407.98 1666.19 3934.45 4881.51
8 58 0.83 0.62 0.82 0.59 6.05 5.694 4.33 7.67 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 3866.06 441.62 3740.55 3991.57
9 64 0.58 0.69 0.75 0.61 5.28 3.998 4.15 6.42 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.90 0.303 0.91 0.99 3910.34 114.49 3877.80 3942.88
10 69 0.60 0.74 0.58 0.69 5.15 3.952 4.03 6.28 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 4037.26 861.14 3792.53 4281.99
11 67 0.76 0.84 0.62 0.52 4.83 2.450 4.14 5.53 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 3916.02 32.35 3906.83 3925.21
12 70 0.73 0.83 0.76 0.84 6.02 5.511 4.46 7.59 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.328 0.79 0.97 4042.70 860.93 3798.03 4287.37
13 61 0.57 0.70 0.71 0.54 5.99 6.891 4.03 7.95 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 3923.26 35.19 3913.26 3933.26
14 73 0.63 0.81 0.55 0.70 4.27 3.151 3.37 5.16 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.82 0.388 0.71 0.93 3921.98 71.72 3901.60 3942.36
15 63 0.80 0.82 0.63 0.50 6.29 6.944 4.31 8.26 0.96 0.198 0.90 1.00 0.88 0.328 0.79 0.97 4171.20 1202.93 3829.33 4513.07
16 72 0.71 0.85 0.78 0.82 6.06 5.157 4.59 7.52 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.198 0.90 1.00 3922.40 43.95 3909.91 3934.89
17 57 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 6.93 6.990 4.95 8.92 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.198 0.90 1.00 3930.94 58.26 3914.38 3947.50
18 32 0.70 0.78 0.54 0.63 4.68 5.489 3.12 6.24 0.96 0.198 0.90 1.00 0.78 0.418 0.66 0.90 4169.22 1203.24 3827.26 4511.18
19 37 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.78 4.62 3.553 3.61 5.63 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.328 0.79 0.97 4039.96 860.84 3795.31 4284.61
20 38 0.53 0.80 0.84 0.64 6.17 6.234 4.40 7.94 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.351 0.76 0.96 3923.58 40.47 3912.08 3935.08
21 53 0.50 0.71 0.52 0.80 3.88 3.044 3.02 4.75 0.96 0.198 0.90 1.00 0.70 0.463 0.57 0.83 4045.14 861.89 3800.20 4290.09
22 35 0.69 0.77 0.61 0.60 5.21 6.952 2.24 7.19 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.78 0.418 0.66 0.90 4032.90 861.49 3788.07 4277.73
23 34 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.77 4.72 3.640 3.69 5.76 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 3912.78 29.79 3904.31 3921.25
24 47 0.51 0.76 0.85 0.62 5.40 5.954 3.80 7.08 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 4041.00 860.85 3796.35 4285.65
25 55 0.52 0.73 0.53 0.76 4.87 5.171 3.40 6.34 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.351 0.76 0.96 3909.44 27.25 3901.70 3917.18
26 49 0.77 0.66 0.60 0.74 3.87 2.931 3.04 4.70 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.370 0.73 0.05 3920.74 53.01 3905.67 3935.81
27 44 0.75 0.61 0.77 0.66 4.68 4.995 3.26 6.10 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 4038.28 860.96 3793.60 4282.96
28 46 0.59 0.51 0.73 0.83 5.47 5.603 3.88 7.06 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.96 0.198 0.90 1.00 4053.48 862.32 3808.41 4298.55
29 43 0.62 0.52 0.59 0.51 3.73 3.215 2.82 4.65 0.94 0.240 0.87 1.00 0.84 0.370 0.73 0.95 4278.96 1461.44 3863.62 4694.30
30 52 0.78 0.65 0.64 0.81 5.06 3.222 4.14 5.97 0.98 0.141 0.94 1.00 0.94 0.240 0.87 1.00 4038.80 860.76 3794.17 4283.43
31 40 0.72 0.54 0.80 0.65 4.63 5.392 3.10 6.16 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.328 0.79 0.97 3909.76 35.51 3899.67 3919.85
32 50 0.55 0.53 0.72 0.85 5.03 5.630 3.43 6.63 1.00 0.000 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.351 0.76 0.96 3916.64 35.38 3906.59 3926.69
33 41 0.64 0.50 0.57 0.53 3.81 5.092 2.36 5.26 0.92 0.274 0.84 1.00 0.70 0.463 0.57 0.83 4401.76 1667.89 3927.75 4875.77




Figure 29.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 1. 
 
Figure 30.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 2. 
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Figure 31.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 3. 
 
Figure 32.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 4. 
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Figure 33.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 5. 
 
Figure 34.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 6. 
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Figure 35.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 7. 
 
Figure 36.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 8. 
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Figure 37.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 9. 
 
Figure 38.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 10. 
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Figure 39.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 11. 
 
Figure 40.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 12. 
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Figure 41.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 13. 
 
Figure 42.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 14. 
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Figure 43.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 15. 
 
Figure 44.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 16. 
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Figure 45.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 17. 
 
Figure 46.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 18. 
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Figure 47.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 19. 
 
Figure 48.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 20. 
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Figure 49.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 21. 
 
Figure 50.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 22. 
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Figure 51.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 23. 
 
Figure 52.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 24. 
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Figure 53.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 25. 
 
Figure 54.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 26. 
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Figure 55.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 27. 
 
Figure 56.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 28. 
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Figure 57.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 29. 
 
Figure 58.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 30. 
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Figure 59.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 31. 
 
Figure 60.  Distribution Plots for Design Point 32. 
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